Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-2005

Examining the Impact of Quality Assurance Manning Practices in
USAF Aircraft Maintenance Units
Terry D. Moore

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Business Analytics Commons

Recommended Citation
Moore, Terry D., "Examining the Impact of Quality Assurance Manning Practices in USAF Aircraft
Maintenance Units" (2005). Theses and Dissertations. 3764.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3764

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE MANNING
PRACTICES IN USAF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNITS
THESIS
Terry D. Moore, CMSgt, USAF
AFIT/GLM/ENS/05-18

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United
States Government.

AFIT/GLM/ENS/05-18

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE MANNING
PRACTICES IN USAF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNITS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Operational Sciences
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

Terry D. Moore, BS
Chief Master Sergeant, USAF
March 2005

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT/GLM/ENS/05-18

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE MANNING
PRACTICES IN USAF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNITS

Terry D. Moore, B.S.
Chief Master Sergeant, USAF

Approved:

/signed/
____________________________________
Dr. Alan Johnson (Chairman)

date

/signed/
____________________________________
Dr. Michael Rehg (Member)

date

/signed/
____________________________________
Dr. Michael Hicks (Member)

date

AFIT/GLM/ENS/05-18
Abstract
Sponsored by Air Combat Command (ACC), the purpose of this research was to
examine the impact that current USAF Quality Assurance (QA) manning practices has on
key aircraft wing- and unit-level metrics.
Interviews and surveys culminated in development of a QA Manning
Effectiveness Matrix. We then used the matrix to calculate historical QA manning
effectiveness at 16 ACC bases. Effectiveness scores were regressed with associated
historical data for 26 metrics derived from a Delphi survey. Nine metrics were deemed
statistically significant, including break rates, cannibalization rates, flying schedule
effectiveness rates, key task list pass rates, maintenance scheduling effectiveness rates,
quality verification inspection pass rates, repeat rates, dropped objects counts and
safety/technical violations counts. An example benefit cost analysis for changes in QA
manning effectiveness was performed, using reasonable cost values. The results present
compelling evidence for aircraft maintenance managers to carefully weigh decisions to
leave QA manning slots empty, or to assign personnel possessing other than authorized
credentials. Furthermore, aircraft maintenance managers can use this tool to help
determine mitigating strategies for improving unit performance with respect to the nine
metrics.
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This goes to all the devoted maintainers on the Flight line and in the Maintenance Shops.
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EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE MANNING
PRACTICES IN USAF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNITS
I. Introduction
Overview
USAF combat aircraft flying units are the main focus of this research. These
flying units require thousands of maintenance technicians, all performing a myriad of
distinctive and specialized functions in order to safely execute launch, recovery,
servicing, re-arming, and modification operations. Key to ensuring that the countless
critical steps involved in these activities are executed according to written direction is
having proactive and involved leadership and management at all levels of execution.
However, since the effective reach of unit leaders and managers is extremely limited,
they rely heavily on a highly structured cadre of experienced and skilled technicians who
provide daily oversight, an on-the-spot correction capability, training, an investigative
capacity, and a mechanism for formal feedback to leadership to use for analysis and
possible future mitigation of underlying causal factors. This cadre of experts is formally
known as the Maintenance Group Quality Assurance Flight.
Problem Statement
Mid-level Air Force managers and leaders in aircraft maintenance units need to
know the potential mission impact of leaving validated Unit Manpower Document
(UMD) authorized Quality Assurance (QA) manpower positions unfilled or of assigning
personnel with mismatched Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) against these positions.
This research will attempt to systematically identify and quantify possible impacts and
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consequences that leaving QA manpower positions unfilled or “mismatching” personnel
against QA manpower slots designated on the Unit Manpower Document (UMD) could
have on safety, quality, and mission capability factors in order to assist Air Force
maintenance managers when making these important QA manning decisions.
Background
Recent research conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology revealed a
statistical correlation between aircraft mission capable rates (the primary metric in the
USAF that measures the percentage of assigned aircraft capable of meeting their primary
mission), and manning levels along with experience levels of assigned aircraft
maintenance personnel (Oliver, 2001). This study attempts to build on this premise by
focusing on one high-demand; low-density manpower resource – the aircraft/munitions
maintenance quality assurance (QA) flight.
A 1996 General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee
on Acquisition and Technology, Committee on Armed Services stated that Based on
studies performed for DOD, we estimate that it spends more than $1.5 billion annually
beyond what is necessary to support its quality assurance approach (GAO, 1996).
Furthermore, traditional quality assurance techniques have historically relied upon many
after-the-fact inspections, increasing costs in both time and money. To remain profitable,
manufacturers switched from detection, to prevention-based quality strategies which
replaced end-item inspections. Although the approach in the GAO report is primarily
procurement and acquisition-related, prevention-based quality strategies has not become
a reality in the United States Air Force (USAF). More specifically, we in the Air Force
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still rely heavily on our traditional QA as a detection function to catch problems before
they escalate.
Furthermore, the GAO's analysis of data reported by all services showed that
human error contributed to seventy-three percent of Class A flight mishaps in Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995. In Air Force mishaps, human error was a factor seventy-one
percent of the time. For the Army, the figure was seventy-six percent. According to the
Naval Safety Center, human error was a factor in eighty percent of the Navy and Marine
Corps Class-A mishaps for Fiscal Years 1990 through 1994. The fact that nearly threefourths of accidents have a human error factor doesn't necessarily mean that the human
caused the problem. Often, some other problem occurs, but at some point the human
could have or should have intervened to change the course of events--and that someone is
not always the pilot. It could be anyone from the air traffic controller, to the
maintenance crew (GAO, 1996).
This point was tragically highlighted in May 1995, when an F-15 pilot was killed
shortly after takeoff from one of our air bases. According to a 1998 “Aerospace World”
report, the accident investigation revealed that a mechanic accidentally crossed flight
control rods in the aircraft while reinstalling them and another mechanic failed to catch
the miscue which made the jet impossible to control in the air (Grier, 1998). Also
according to the same report, several previous incidents in which other mechanics made
the same mistakes should have alerted the Air Force to a potential problem. In fact, the
review board noted that similar crossed-rod cases occurred at least twice before, but in
both instances, the problem was caught before takeoff. Although the Air Force has since
taken steps to ensure this mistake doesn’t happen again by color-coding the control rods
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and adding a warning to the technical manuals (Grier, 1998), catching these types of
design issues and ensuring flight-critical inspections are performed correctly are
fundamental to the QA function.

Figure 1 – F-16 Maintenance-Related Mishap (Photo Courtesy of USAF Safety Center)
In several recent incidents, the impact of improper maintenance was deeply felt. In
the first case, an airman was performing an F-16 engine run at one of our bases when it
“jumped” over the wooden wheel chocks designed to keep the aircraft from moving (see
Figure 1). The F-16 subsequently came to rest on its side damaging its right wing, nose
gear, and right landing gear. In a review of the mishap’s factual data by the Air Force
Safety Center’s aircraft maintenance expert, the following maintenance-related facts were
foundational to this mishap (Moening, 2005):
•

Using bad chocks (training and lack of management oversight).
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•

A temperature condition that provided more thrust than expected (training).

•

The technician had no previous training on what to do if the jet jumped chocks;
the technician was following all unit procedures, but unit supervision chose to
allow engine runs on packed snow and ice and didn't think the “jump chocks
training” was important (gross leadership failure) (Moening, 2005).

Figure 2 – F-15 Maintenance-Related Mishap (Photo Courtesy of USAF Safety Center)
Another incident provides further proof of the value of correct maintenance. In this case
an F-15 aircraft was extensively damaged when an avionics access door came unlatched
in flight (see Figure 2). In a review of the mishap’s factual data by the Air Force Safety
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Center’s aircraft maintenance expert, the following maintenance-related facts were
foundational to this mishap (Moening, 2005):
• During Phase inspection, the securing rings for the fasteners were not installed
(training, procedural error, and lack of management oversight).
• The panel was incorrectly secured after "red ball" maintenance (training,
procedural error, and lack of management oversight) (Moening, 2005).
A final example tries to answer a famous physics question: What happens when
an irresistible force meets an immovable object? In this case, the aircraft was on the
losing end and a multi-million dollar fighter jet was severely damaged (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 – F-16 Maintenance-Related Mishap (Photo Courtesy of USAF Safety Center)
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The scenario involved an F-16 being towed during nighttime hours when it impacted an
aircraft clear-water rinse structure. The jet’s nose landing gear subsequently collapsed
causing extensive damage to the nose landing gear, nose gear well, nose radome, and
engine inlet structure. In a review of the mishap’s factual data by the Air Force Safety
Center’s aircraft maintenance expert, the following maintenance-related facts were
foundational to this mishap (Moening, 2005):
•

The tow team supervisor who had only been on base one month was improperly
trained (training consisted of being told “here's the book, read it") (failure of
leadership).

•

The tow crew veered to the right of taxiway center line for no discernable reason
resulting in the aircraft impacting the clear-water rinse structure (training and lack
of management oversight) (Moening, 2005).

These are all eye-opening examples of the importance of proper maintenance which
further underscore the criticality of maintenance leadership, management, and oversight.
Maintenance-Related Mishaps, Recent History
Table 1 explains the three mishap classes used in the USAF for both Flight and
Ground categories while Figures 4 through 6 provide a high-level view of the impact that
improper maintenance has on USAF mission readiness (note the middle columns in each
individual FY in Figures 4 through 6 indicate maintenance-related mishaps only).
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Table 1 – Air Force Mishap Classifications

Figure 4 – Class-A Mishap Data (Source: USAF Safety Center)
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Figure 5 – Class-B Mishap Data (Source: USAF Safety Center)

Figure 6 – Class-C Mishap Data (Source: USAF Safety Center)
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Furthermore, in Fiscal Year 2004 alone, USAF maintenance-related mishaps cost U.S.
taxpayers $24,573,947. The following is breakdown of those costs by mishap category:
•

Class A Mishaps - $10,433,572

•

Class B Mishaps - $5,584,814

•

Class C Mishaps - $8,555,561

According to a 2005 USAF Safety Center Report, this is enough money to pay for
•

5.4 - F100-PW-229 Engines at $4.5 Million each, or…

•

652 - GBU-31 JDAMS (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) at $37,670 each, or…

•

722,763 – man-hours at $34 per hour

Maintenance-related mishaps create a massive opportunity cost or more specifically loss!
The following is a top-ten breakout of what caused these maintenance-related mishaps
(Moening, 2005):
1) Failure to follow published Technical Data or local instructions
2) Using an unauthorized procedure not referenced in Technical Data
3) Supervisors accepting non-use of Technical Data or failure to follow maintenance
requirements
4) Failure to document maintenance in the AFTO Form 781 or engine work package
5) Inattention to detail/complacency
6) Incorrectly installing hardware on an aircraft/engine
7) Performing an unauthorized modification to the aircraft
8) Failure to conduct a tool inventory after completion of the task
9) Personnel not trained or certified to perform the task
10) Ground support equipment improperly positioned for the task
10

Since QA functions have historically been a critical process within any effective
maintenance organization, the key to a aircraft maintenance QA flight’s effectiveness are
the “qualities” of personnel assigned to the very limited manning slots. The criticality of
this concept is best illustrated by examining the composition of an average active duty
USAF aircraft flying wing.
In order to get the “right” personnel mix, the Air Force performs extensive
manpower studies to determine with great precision the proper AFSC and skill level
combinations needed to populate a QA shop to enable it to perform its duties to include
all exercise, war, and peacetime tasks. However, because of resource constraints and a
very high demand for this low-density, high-demand capability, maintenance managers
and leaders are sometimes forced to make tradeoffs when deciding how to man QA
manpower slots.
Faced with constricted manning resources, maintenance leaders responsible for
staffing QA are often forced to make difficult decisions to deviate from the UMD and
substitute AFSCs or possibly even leave a QA manning slot vacant. Although these
substitution and vacancy decisions are not made in a vacuum, the potential impact of the
“deal” is sometimes lost in the dilemma to either “fill a QA slot” or continue to produce
maintenance on the flight line/in the maintenance shops. This is because no tool
currently exists to help maintenance managers making these decisions. This means they
must rely wholly on past experience and a “gut” feel which could become a problem for
inexperienced maintenance managers.
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The Research Question
This research seeks to answer the question: What effect does “mismatching”
AFSCs or leaving unit manpower document (UMD) authorized manpower positions
unfilled in wing aircraft maintenance QA units have on unit- or key wing-level measures?
The Investigative Questions
Multiple questions were addressed in order to answer the research question:
1) Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most affected by an empty QA
manning position or an AFSC mismatch?
2) How effective is a worker when assigned to a QA duty position requiring a
different UMD-authorized AFSC (how good is the “fit”)?
3) What is the relationship between QA manning effectiveness and key unit- and
wing-level metrics?
Overview of Remaining Chapters
In this chapter we introduced the problem and provided some background
information. In Chapter II, we review the literature examined to gain insight into the QA
construct along with how the Air Force allocates and assigns manpower to QA flights.
We also review some of the more important types of metrics found in Air Force
maintenance organizations. In Chapter III, we examine the methodology used in the
study. In Chapter IV, we create maintenance effectiveness ratings for the 16 bases
participating in the study and in Chapter V, we apply these Effectiveness ratings to the
different metric data types. Lastly, in Chapter VI, we provide conclusions and
recommendations for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
This chapter summarizes the foundational literature this research used. Numerous
publications are dedicated to employee performance but few investigate the link between
Quality Assurance (QA) and employee performance and the ones that do, are oftentimes
found in accident or incident reports. This research begins with an example of QA’s
importance in a commercial aviation setting. We then investigate the Air Force construct
relating to QA.
The Commercial Aviation Industry Link
On May 11, 1996, ValueJet Flight 592, a DC-9-32 passenger aircraft caught fire
in-flight and crashed into the Florida Everglades. The crash killed 110 people and was
attributed to contract maintenance personnel improperly rendering safe and shipping
oxygen cylinders in the cargo hold of the aircraft. The National Transportation Safety
Board Investigation report cited numerous contributing factors behind the crash:
The continuing lack of an explicit requirement for the principal maintenance
inspector of a Part 121 operator to regularly inspect or surveil Part 145 repair
stations that are performing heavy maintenance for their air carriers is a
significant deficiency… Improper maintenance activities and false entries pose a
serious threat to aviation safety and must be curtailed.
This observation is referring to the fact that ValueJet subcontracted their heavy
maintenance work out to Sabre Tech who performed the maintenance on the oxygen
canisters for ValueJet. The report then linked this observation to the need to have the
right number of people in the right jobs with the following ruling:
In part because he was responsible for so many operators, the principal
maintenance inspector assigned to oversee the Sabre Tech facility in Miami was
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unable to provide affective oversight of the ValueJet heavy maintenance
operations conducted at the facility.
And finally, the report stated the reason for the crash was:
ValueJet failed to adequately oversee Sabre Tech and this failure was the cause of
the accident. (NTSB, 1997).

Understanding the Quality Assurance Construct
The purpose of Quality Assurance within the Department of Defense (DoD) was
initially established in the former DoD Directive 4155.1 which stated:
The primary purpose of quality assurance is the enforcement of technical criteria
and requirements governing all materials, data, supplies, and services developed,
procured, produced, stored, operated, maintained, overhauled, or disposed of by
or for the DoD.
Although this directive no longer exists, the concept is still valid and quality assurance
(previously known as quality control), continues to be a critical tool to a manager’s
ability to keep abreast of the health of their organization. L. Marvin Johnson, a
Registered Professional Quality Engineer and author with forty-eight years of experience
in quality assurance and related fields summed up the concept very succinctly:
Involved management and discipline is the key to quality. Evaluations are the
investigations that determine the extent of an activity’s ability to implement and
maintain the self controls necessary to administer an effective quality program
(Johnson, 1990).
“In the U.S. Navy, the process for ensuring adherence to maintenance standards
involves a quality assurance function designed to perform inspections, audits and quality
checks on flight equipment and maintenance processes” (OPNAVINST 4790, chap 14).
The following excerpt overviews the purpose behind the Navy’s QA program:
QA provides a systematic and efficient method for gathering, analyzing, and
maintaining information on the quality characteristics of products, the source and
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nature of defects, and their immediate impact on the current operation. It permits
decisions to be based on facts rather than intuition or memory and provides
comparative data which is useful long after the details of the particular time or
events have passed. The objective of QA is to readily pinpoint problem areas in
which management can:
1) Improve the quality, uniformity, and reliability of the total maintenance effort.
2) Improve the work environment, tools, and equipment used in the maintenance
effort.
3) Eliminate unnecessary man-hour and dollar expenditures.
4) Improve training, work habits, and procedures of maintenance personnel.
5) Increase the excellence and value of reports and correspondence originated by
maintenance personnel.
6) Effectively disseminate technical information.
7) Establish realistic material and equipment requirements in support of the
maintenance effort (OPNAVINST 4790.2H, 2001).
OPNAVINST 4790.2H continues on to describe the Navy QA function as a small group
of experts who perform quality checks, inspections, and audits in order to collect data
and monitor trends with the objective of improving processes.

The Link Between Management, Experience, and Quality Results in the Workplace
In 1976, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center conducted a
study to determine the relationship between the “operational effectiveness of U.S. Navy
ships and the manning level of selected enlisted ratings. The relationship between
manning levels and ship performance were investigated on 105 naval ships for the period
January 1972 to January 1975. Manning levels in the study were expressed as the ratio of
the number of personnel allocated to the ships to the number authorized and scores
achieved on final battle problems following refresher training were used as the measure
of ship performance. Correlation coefficients were computed between manning level and
performance for various combinations of the independent variables, and were tested for
statistical significance. In general, an increase in the number of personnel in the lower
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pay grades tends to degrade ship performance and an increase in the number of personnel
in the higher pay grades tends to improve ship performance.” The study recommended:
…caution be used in reducing manpower allocated to ships, especially in the
higher pay grades. To the extent possible, billets in the higher pay grades should
not be filled with personnel in lower pay grades. (Holzbach, 1991).
The results of this study underscore the concept that having more personnel with higher
experience levels (i.e. those in higher pay grades) leads to higher level results.
In another study conducted by the Naval Surface Weapons Center, a loss control
system was described which employed management introspect for determining the
underlying causes of accidents and hazardous situations, and to improve the overall
effect of accident prevention activities. Monetary and productive waste and losses, as
well as accidents, were reduced by using accidents and hazards as indicators to detect
management failures. Further, procedures were outlined, together with examples to
demonstrate how investigation of minor injuries and unsafe conditions can identify the
management failures which are causing huge hidden losses as well as accidents. A
logical method was given to track the primary cause of accidents and hazards back to the
underlying management failures. Management failures were placed in general
categories and summarized to determine and locate problem areas (Fine, 1975). The
process described here underscores the critical impact of management’s oversight on safe
task accomplishment by the workforce. Aircraft maintenance QA is this oversight.
A study conducted at the Naval Post Graduate School investigated Naval
Aviation’s efforts to reduce its mishap rate. The study highlighted that management
focus has logically expanded to include maintenance operations. It further stated that
human error is accepted as a causal factor in at least eighty percent of all mishaps, with
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maintainer, line, or facility-related factors accounting for one out of five major mishaps
(Hernandez, 2001). Again, this underscores the concept that leadership and management
understands the link between accidents and human frailty.
The following excerpt from a U.S. Army Safety Center-issued report directly
supports this claim:
Accidents during maintenance activities are an indication of operational
weaknesses that, in combat, would quickly deplete our maintenance capability
and affect readiness. Maintenance, which keeps the troops on the move, is filled
with risks. Eliminating or reducing those risks is a key part of carrying out the
maintenance mission. The key to reducing risks to acceptable levels is training to
standard and enforcing standards. (USASC, 1991).
This report specifically focuses on the leading causes of accidents in maintenance
operations and provides general countermeasures for those accidents.
Furthermore, the universality of the issues behind having the right types of
manpower and getting desired results must not be overlooked. In the mid 1980s, the
Turkish Air Force changed its centralized aircraft maintenance system to the combat
oriented maintenance system for the F-16 implementation. They did this to take
advantage of the new system’s inherent ability to contribute to operational readiness and
sustainability and to allow more efficient management of manpower resources. This was
because they understood that efficient management of manpower becomes even more
critical as a new program is implemented and a new weapon system becomes operational,
and furthermore that enhanced supportability depends upon efficient and effective
resource allocation. The research specifically addressed the impact of reliability and
maintainability on maintenance manpower requirements and mission effectiveness
(Akpinar, 1986).
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How the Air Force Programs and Allocates Manpower to Units
Although this study is not meant to analyze how manpower is “earned” by the
various QA units in ACC, having a basic working knowledge of the AF manpower
system is essential to accepting one of the foundational assumptions that the study is
based on. Specifically, this study assumes that each QA unit’s UMD consists of the
correct number of manpower authorizations required for the mission they are tasked to
perform. What follows is a brief overview of the manpower determination process (see
Figure 7).

Figure 7 – Simplified Block Diagram Tracing Development of a Valid UMD
At the highest level, the AF Directorate of Manpower, Organization and Quality,
Program Development Division (HQ USAF/XPMP) allocates programmed manpower
resources to the commands directing implementation of approved programs. Next, each
command translates these manpower resources into manpower authorizations by
notifying the respective Manpower Office. The local Manpower Office notifies the unit
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and the unit is responsible to input the data to the manpower office to update the Unit
Manpower Document (UMD) by organization, AFSC, grade, and program element code.
The Manpower and Organization Office then provides this detailed identification to the
respective organization and the personnel community (AFI 38-204).
Basis for UMDs
An Air Force Manpower Standard (AFMS) is the basis for all AF manpower
requirements and AF manpower is based on man-hour requirements. Man-hour
requirements are further determined in one of three ways, all of which are rooted in a
systematic scientific process. The two most often used for Air Combat Command (ACC)
aircraft maintenance/munitions units are the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) and the
conventional manpower standard. As a side note, each ACC base’s Manpower Office is
responsible for conducting each of these manpower determinant processes with the
approval authority running from AFMA to AF/XPMO an finally to AF/DPM as final
approval authority. The first determinant process uses the LCOM.
The LCOM is a discrete-event computer simulation used to model manpower and
other logistical requirements by considering employment of different resources to help
the user decide the best mix to support a given requirement. Because LCOM studies can
identify peacetime and wartime requirements, these studies provide a more defensible
budget position and allow for effective use of available resources (AFI 38-208, Vol 3,
para 1). The second manpower requirements development process is the conventional
manpower standard. The conventional manpower standard is a formula based on aircraft
type and mission (e.g. every aircraft squadron equipped with 24, F-15Cs tasked with an
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air superiority mission have the same number of crew chiefs, avionics technicians, line
expeditors, etc based on the standard). A third and final process to develop manpower
requirements is provided for in AFI 38-210, para 2.6. The instruction states:
Commands may determine aircraft maintenance manpower requirements using
aircraft specific maintenance man-hour per flying hour (MMH/FH) factors when
more rigorous methods (conventional manpower standards or Logistics
Composite Model manpower determinants) are not available (AFI 38-210, para
2.6).
Although the MMH/FH process is also computationally grounded, it is not as
rigorous as the two prior methods. The MMH/FH technique uses basic standard
weighted formulas for different sub-processes within the AF function being examined
and is broken down by Productive Manning, Addenda (Survival Shop, Aerospace Ground
Equipment, etc), and Additives (Munitions, Electronic Countermeasures Pods, etc.).
Again, this is not the preferred process for determining manpower requirements (AFI 38210, para 2.6). However, whichever of the three processes is used, they all result in a
manpower determinant, and this determinant may ultimately result in creation of a UMD.
Like all other USAF UMDs, Air Combat Command QA UMDs were developed using
one of these three processes (see Table 2 for an example of a UMD).

Table 2 – Unit Manning Document (UMD) Excerpt
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Unit Manpower Document
XXXXX

Printed On
1/1/2005

POS
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C

1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C
1C

OSC: MXQ - QUALITY ASSURANCE
AFSC and TITLE

01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C

ACFT MAINTENANCE
AIRCRAFT MGR
AEROSPACE MAI CRFTM
AEROSPC PRP CRFTMN
NUCLEAR WEP CRFT
ACFT ARM SYS JYMN
NUCLEAR WEP JYMN
NUCLEAR WEP JYMN
INFORMATION JYMN

OSC:
FAC:

MXQ - QUALITY ASSURANCE
12345 - QUALITY ASSURANCE

POS

Query: MXG

OSC: MXQI - INSPECTION
AFSC and TITLE

01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C
01234567C

AEROSPACE MAI SUPT
AEROSPACE MAI SUPT
AEROSPC PRP CRFTMN
INTG AVN SYS/INS CFM
INTG AVN SYS EW CFTM
AERO GR EQUIP CRFT
ACF EL/ENV SYS CRFT
MSL/SPC SY MA CRFT
AEROSPACE MAI JYMN
ACFT HYDR SYS JYMN
ACFT STRC MAIN JYMN
MUNITIONS SYS JYMN
ACFT ARM SYS JYMN

OSC:
FAC:

MXQI - INSPECTION
21A100 - QUALITY ASSURANCE

FAC: 12345 - QUALITY ASSURANCE
SEI
GRD

RGR

PEC

021A3
2A300
2A571
2A671A
2W271
2W151
2W251
2W251
3A051

MAJOR
CMSGT
TSGT
TSGT
TSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT

AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN

FAC: 12345- QUALITY ASSURANCE
SEI
GRD

RGR

PEC

2A590
2A590
2A671A
2A573B
2A573C
2A672
2A676
2M071
2A551K
2A655
2A753
2W051
2W151

SMSGT
SMSGT
MSGT
TSGT
TSGT
MSGT
TSGT
TSGT
TSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT

AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN
AN

CAPT
CMSGT
TSGT
TSGT
TSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT

SMSGT
SMSGT
MSGT
TSGT
TSGT
TSGT
TSGT
TSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT
SSGT

Directives Supporting the Requirement for AF Maintenance QA
The QA UMD is the result of a manpower determination. As such, the UMD is
the legal authorization to hire and pay for all personnel assigned to the QA flight, to
include overhead positions (management and supervision), all inspector positions, the AF
Repair Enhancement shop, and the administrative function. To fully understand the
requirements that the UMD was created to support, we review the specific functions that
QA personnel are required to perform.
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The basic requirement for a QA function is spelled out in AFI 21-101 (para 10.2):
•

Responsible to the Maintenance Group (MXG) Commander to perform as the
primary technical advisory agency for maintenance, assisting work center
supervisors

The following is the remaining list of other QA responsibilities (AFI 21-101, para 10.2):
•

Implements and administers the Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation
Program (MSEP)

•

Manages the Product Improvement Program (PIP)

•

Manages the Deficiency Reporting (DR) Program

•

Manages the Product Improvement Working Group (PWIG)

•

Manages the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Working Group

•

Manages the Technical Order Distribution Office (TODO)

•

Manages the One-Time Inspections (OTI) Program

•

Manages the Functional Check Flight (FCF) Program

•

Manages the Weight and Balance (W&B) Program

•

Manages the Hot Refuel Program (Hotpits)

•

Manages the Aircraft and Equipment Impoundment Program

•

Reviews aircraft aborts, in-flight emergencies (IFE), and other incidents as
required using MIS or MAJCOM forms

•

Assists Maintenance Operations Flight (MOF) Plans Scheduling and
Documentation (PS&D) and the Munitions Flight with the Configuration
Management Program
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•

Assists MOF PS&D with the Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) program

•

Implements the unit chafing awareness program

•

QA inspectors augment weapons loading inspection/evaluations at the request of
Weapons Standardization Section

•

QA uses their technical expertise to assist the MXG to arrive at informed
decisions when coordinating with higher headquarters, AF Materiel Command,
Defense Contract Maintenance Agency, and other outside agencies

•

Evaluates unit maintenance management procedures, including locally developed
forms, publications, operating instructions, etc, for accuracy, intent, and necessity

•

Ensures management/evaluation of Special Programs listed in AFI 21-101,
Chapter 18 as assigned by the MXG Commander (32 Special Programs listed)

•

Manages the Air Force Repair Enhancement Program (AFREP)

Now that we have described the QA construct, we investigate the literature on
maintenance metrics.
Examining Maintenance-Related Metrics
In the USAF Maintenance Metrics Handbook forward section, Brigadier General
Terry Gabreski, Director of Logistics for the Air Force Material Command, said:
Metrics are critical tools to be used by maintenance managers to gauge an
organization’s effectiveness and efficiency. In fact they are roadmaps that let you
determine where you’ve been, where you are going, and how (or if) you are going
to get there (AFLMA, 2002).
The handbook further explained that metrics are not just charts and numbers to be looked
at, but are rather tools for fixing problems. Since the overarching objective of AF
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maintenance is to maintain aerospace equipment in a safe, serviceable, and ready
condition to meet mission needs, maintenance management metrics serve this objective
(AFI 21-101, para 10.1). The paragraph further states that metrics shall be used at all
levels of command to drive improved performance and adhere to well established
guidelines and that:
•

Metrics must be accurate and useful for decision-making

•

Metrics must be consistent and clearly linked to goals/standards

•

Metrics must be clearly understood and communicated

•

Metrics must be based on a measurable, well-defined process
Metrics -- Leading and Lagging
The instruction also delineated that primary maintenance metrics are grouped into

various categories with the two more important categories being “leading” and “lagging”
indicators. The leading indicators show a problem first because they directly impact
maintenance’s capability to provide resources to execute the mission, whereas lagging
indicators follow, and show firmly established trends. In the instruction, those
maintenance metrics that the Air Force considers as primary, are listed in alphabetical
order along with relevant formulas and examples (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3). We
address these formulas again in Chapter V.
The Air Combat Command Flying Wing Structure
An average Air Combat Command (ACC) flying wing contains four groups: a
Medical Group (Primary Care, Emergency, Operations, Mobility, Flight Medicine, etc); a
Support Group (Security Forces, Civil Engineer, Base Personnel Office, etc.); an
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Operations Group (pilots, Life Support, Air Space Scheduling, Air Traffic Control,
Weather, Flight Records, Intelligence, Airfield Operations, etc.); and a Maintenance
Group (Component Maintenance, Equipment Maintenance, Maintenance Scheduling,
Maintenance Analysis, Quality Assurance, Munitions, End-of Runway, Maintenance
Support, etc.). As a further drill-down, we will first examine the functional hierarchy
Maintenance Group and then the Quality Assurance sub-function.
The Air Force Maintenance Group
In line with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 21-101, the Maintenance Group is primarily
responsible for performing organizational level (on-equipment) and intermediate level
(back shop, off-equipment) maintenance. This effort requires many personnel,
performing a multitude of diverse and specialized tasks (see Figure 8).
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Typical Flying Wing

Support Group (SG)
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Squadron (EMS)
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Component Maintenance
Squadron (CMS)
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Quality Assurance

Munitions (AMMO)
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Element (APG)

Conventional
Nuclear

Aircraft Maintenance Flight
#1

Small Gas Engine Shop
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Specialist Element

Precision Guided

Armament Flight

Support/Supply

Alternate Mission
Equipment

Aircraft Maintenance Flight
#2

Aircraft Guns

Aircraft Maintenance Flight
#3
Aircraft Maintenance Flight
#4

Maintenance Flight
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Wheel and Tire

Crash Recovery

Aircraft Repair and
Reclamation
Phase Inspection

Fabrication Flight

Structures

Metals Technology

Non-Destructive Inspection

Survival Equipment

Figure 8 – Maintenance Group Functional Diagram

More specifically, the Maintenance Group Commander is “responsible for
aerospace equipment maintenance required to ensure balance between sortie production
and fleet management” (AFI 21-101, paragraph 2.3). Although this may sound simplistic
and straightforward, it is not. In fact, this research uncovered that a typical ACC
Maintenance Group is comprised of between 2,500 and 3,500 maintenance personnel.
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Effectively utilizing this number of diverse personnel in itself can be a daunting
leadership and management challenge but add to this the high-stress and fast-paced
element that comes with the daily training and combat operations, and the criticality
factors increase exponentially. This is where the Maintenance Group Commander needs
help and this help comes in the form of a highly specialized and mature workforce of
maintenance personnel who are hand-picked to form the Maintenance group Quality
Assurance Flight. According to AFI 21-101, paragraph 10.1:
The combined efforts of quality assurance personnel, maintenance leaders, and
technicians are necessary to ensure high-quality maintenance production and
equipment reliability. Maintenance leaders are responsible for safety of flight,
safety of equipment operation, and quality maintenance production. The quality
assurance staff evaluates the quality of maintained accomplished in the
maintenance organization. Quality assurance personnel are not an extension of
the work force. Quality assurance serves as the primary technical advisory
agency in the maintenance organization, helping production supervisors and the
maintenance group commander resolve quality problems. The evaluation and
analysis of deficiencies and problem areas are key functions of quality assurance.
This activity identifies underlying causes of poor quality in the maintenance
production effort. By finding causes of problems and recommending corrective
actions to supervisors, quality assurance can significantly affect the quality of
maintenance within the maintenance complex.
It is clear from the governing direction how highly regarded the aircraft
maintenance quality assurance function is. Now, taking into account the huge number of
activities and personnel that need this critical quality assurance oversight, it would seem
to require a flight of hundreds to perform this job; however, this is not the reality. In fact,
the average ACC quality assurance flight contains 25 to 30 personnel including overhead.
This equates to an approximate 100-to-1 ratio of maintainers to “assigned” QA inspectors
within a typical aircraft wing’s Maintenance Group (this includes both flight line,
maintenance shops, and munitions storage area personnel. It further indicates a fully-
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staffed QA shop with no one on leave, deployed, in training, etc). Furthermore, when the
QA shop’s management and administrative overhead is factored out and actual shiftmanning is broken down, an effectively scheduled QA shop might be able to muster five
inspectors per 10-hour work shift. Coupled to this is the fact that these “golden five” are
charged with a multitude of duties including providing maintenance oversight, and
performing safety and technical investigations along with task certification for trainees in
upgrade status. They perform these duties all while covering day-to-day contracted task
evaluations. Because of this low ratio of critical QA troops to maintenance personnel, it
is absolutely essential that the “right” people be assigned.
Chapter Overview and Conclusion
In this chapter we provided an overview of the relevant literature. In Chapter III,
we examine the methodology used in the study.
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III. Methodology
Overview
In this chapter, we present the methodology followed. We first present the
research question and investigative questions.
The Research Question
This research seeks to answer the question: What effect does mismatching Air
Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) or leaving unit manpower document (UMD) authorized
manpower positions unfilled in aircraft maintenance QA units have on key unit- and/or
wing-level measures?
The Investigative Questions
Multiple questions were addressed in order to answer the research question:
1) Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most affected by an empty QA
manning position or a mismatch?
2) What is the effectiveness of a person without the UMD-designated AFSC when
performing the QA duties of another AFSC (how good is the “fit”)?
3) What is the relationship between QA manning effectiveness and key unit- and
wing-level metrics?
Analytical Model
This study was completed in four distinct phases directly linked to the three
investigative questions (see Figure 9). Phase-One was comprised of a two-part Delphi
survey sent out to senior aircraft maintenance managers, leaders, and subject matter
experts across Air Combat Command (ACC) aircraft/maintenance units. In this phase,
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key maintenance metrics were identified and a manning effectiveness matrix was
constructed. Phase-Two of the study consisted of acquiring all ACC aircraft flying units’
historical manning and applying the manning effectiveness matrix to this data. In PhaseThree, the subject aircraft flying units’ key unit- and wing-level metrics were compiled
and statistically regressed against the calculated QA manning effectiveness rates. We
then analyzed the regression analysis results in Phase-Four in order to develop potential
mitigating strategies for use by mid-level Air Force aircraft/munitions maintenance
managers. Using the data, we also performed a sample benefit-cost analysis. The four
phases are examined in detail in chapters III through V, but first we will overview the
primary research tool used to garner information to complete Phase One of the study.
PhasePhase-1: Perform 2-Part Delphi
Survey then use the results to
develop: (1) a Candidate List of
Metrics, and (2) the Substitute
AFSC Effectiveness Matrix
(AFSC-MEM)

PhasePhase-2: Retrieve historical QA
manning for all ACC aircraft
units and then use the “AFSCMEM” to calculate an overall QA
Manpower Effectiveness for each
of 16 ACC bases, by month

PhasePhase-4: Analyze the regression
analysis results for correlation
between unit QA historical
manning effectiveness and key
unit- and wing-level metrics;
perform a benefit-cost analysis;
report the findings

Phase -3: Retrieve historical
metric data indicated by SMEs in
Phase-1 then perform a timeseries regression between the
calculated QA manning
effectiveness, and each metric for
all 16 ACC bases

Figure 9 – Flow Diagram of Four-Phase Research Process
The Delphi Technique
The Delphi technique was chosen for Phase-One due to its relative strength of
application compared to the requirements of the study. In essence, the objective of
Phase-One of the study was to develop a useful worker effectiveness rating scale for a
person with a particular skill set when performing the duties of a job different from what
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they are specifically trained for and to elicit the metrics. The Delphi technique provided
a natural fit to gain this type of knowledge.
Delphi Technique – Some Uses
According to Linstone, Harold A. and Murray Turoff, the Delphi technique is
often used to combine and refine the opinions of a heterogeneous group of experts in
order to establish a judgment based on merging of the information collectively available
to the experts (see Figure 10). Further, a Delphi can be characterized as a method for
structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a
group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem. The Delphi Method is
a group-making technique developed as part of an Air Force-sponsored RAND
Corporation study in the early 1950’s. The Delphi Method seeks to achieve consensus
among group members through a series of questionnaires. The questionnaires are
answered anonymously and individually by each member of the group. The answers are
summarized and sent back to the group members along with the next questionnaire. The
process is repeated until a group consensus is reached within a bounds determined a
priori. This usually only takes two iterations, but can sometimes take as many as six
rounds before a consensus is reached (Linstone, Harold A. and Murray Turoff, ed, 1975).

Figure 10 – Delphi Method Flow Diagram
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The Delphi Technique has proven to have many uses among which are:
1) Gathering current and historical data not accurately known or available
2) Examining the significance of historical events
3) Evaluating possible budget allocations
4) Exploring urban and regional planning options
5) Planning university campus and curriculum development
6) Putting together the structure of a model
7) Delineating the pro and cons associated with potential policy options
8) Developing casual relationships in complex economics or social phenomena
9) Distinguishing and clarifying real and perceived human motivations
10) Exposing priorities of personal values, social goals” (Turoff and Linstone, 1975)
This study takes advantage of ‘uses 1, 6, 8 and 10’ from the preceding list.
Delphi Technique – Properties Supporting Its Use
It is not the explicit nature of the applications which determines the
appropriateness of utilizing Delphi; it is the particular circumstances surrounding the
necessarily associated group communication process: Who is it that should communicate
about the problem, what alternative mechanisms are available for that communication,
and what can we expect to obtain with these alternatives? When these questions are
addressed, one can decide if the Delphi is the desirable choice. Usually one or more of
the following properties of the application leads to the need for employing Delphi:
1) The problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but can benefit
from subjective judgment on a collective basis.
2) The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a broad or complex
problem have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse
backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise.
3) More individuals are needed that can effectively interact in a face-to-face
exchange.
4) Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible.
5) The efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group
communication process.
6) Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that the
communication process must be refereed or anonymity assured.
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7) The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assured validity of the
results i.e. avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality
(bandwagon effect) (Turoff and Linstone, 1975).
This study encompasses all of the preceding Delphi technique properties except #6.
Delphi Technique – Potential Problems When Using
There are potential problems with utilizing the Delphi Technique which must be
mitigated for, if the process is expected to be effective. Some of these are:
1) Imposing the monitor’s views and preconceptions upon the respondent group by
over specifying the structure of the Delphi and not allowing for the contribution
of other perspectives related to the problem.
2) Assuming that the Delphi can be a surrogate for all other human communications
in a given situation.
3) Poor techniques of summarizing and preventing the group response and ensuring
common interpretations of the evaluation scales utilized in the exercise.
4) Ignoring and not exploring disagreements, so that the discouraged dissenters
drop out and an artificial consensus is generated.
5) Underestimating the demanding nature of the Delphi and the fact that the
respondents should be recognized as consultants and properly compensated for
their time if the Delphi is not an integral part of their job function (Turoff and
Linstone, 1975).
All of these potential problems were applicable to Phase-One of this study.
Delphi Technique – How to Choose a Good Respondent Group
A typical concern when performing the Delphi Technique is how to choose a
good respondent group in both composition and in number. Not only should the
respondents be volunteers but they should also be subject matter experts who will be able
to participate in the entire Delphi process. This was a problem during this study and it
will be discussed along with mitigating strategies undertaken to account for this. But, the
basic question remains: Just how many respondents does it take to make a good
respondent group? Experiments by Brockhoff (1975) suggest that under ideal
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circumstances, groups as small as four can perform well (Dalkey, 1969). However, like
in most research studies, more data is better. This study is no exception.
To determine the correct group size for our Delphi panel, we looked to the 1969
study performed for the USAF by the RAND Corporation, the creator of the Delphi
Method. In the study, RAND performed an experiment designed to measure the
correlation between the effect of group size and average group error. The results of this
experiment are charted in Figure 11 which clearly shows that the mean accuracy of a
group response for a large set of experimentally derived answers to factual questions,
increases as group size increases (Dalkey, 1969).
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Figure 11 – Effect of Group Size on Error (Dalkey, 1969)

Specifically, with smaller group sizes of between one and seven persons, the
average group error rate behaves exponentially then begins to flatten out as the group size
approaches 15. Also according to the RAND report, reliability of responses increases on
a linear path as the group size increases from three to 11 panelists (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12 – Effect of Group Size on Reliability (Dalkey, 1969)

Furthermore, according to Ludwid, the majority of Delphi studies have used
between 15 and 20 panelists, but Dalkey, Rourke, Lewis, and Snyder (1972) reported a
definite and monolithic increase in group response approaching a correlation coefficient
of 0.9 with a group size of 13 respondents (Ludwid, 1997). Thus, this empirical data
gives us an initial target number of qualified panelists for Phase-One of the study. Based
on this research, we set a minimum requirement of a 2:1 ratio of qualified group members
to actual units under study. This gave us a required starting size of 24 panelists (14 ACC
units x 2) which we easily surpassed with 45 actual volunteers at the beginning of the
study. This correlated well with Clayton’s rule-of-thumb that 15-30 people is an
adequate panel size (Clayton, 1997). At the end of this chapter we will address some
problems associated with self-reports in the Scope and Limitations section. We will now
examine Phase-One of our methodology.
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Phase-One of the Study
Obtaining the ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions
Phase-One began with the researcher contacting ACC/LGQ which is the
headquarters function for ACC quality assurance units. Specifically, the ACC/LGQ
superintendent provided two spreadsheets containing the most current list of QA and
Maintenance Group leadership contacts for all ACC aircraft flying units (QA flight
commanders, chiefs, and superintendents, and maintenance group chiefs). We used this
list to initiate contact with each of the units to ask them if they would provide us a list of
all of their Unit Manning Document (UMD) authorized manpower positions for their
maintenance QA flight. Furthermore, to help standardize the responses, we then created
and sent each of the units a spreadsheet for them to fill in and send back their UMDauthorized manning.
Each of the units subsequently provided the file that contained all of their UMDauthorized manpower positions broken down to the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)
skill-level and shred-out detail (i.e. the C in AFSC 2A551C indicates a B-52 technician).
These original unit UMDs were then aggregated by AFSC, and skill level to develop a
master ACC aircraft quality assurance AFSC list. The resultant list contained 65
different AFSCs delineated by skill-level and shred out that would be used to create a
square matrix for the next sub-phase of the study. However, a list this large would result
in a survey questionnaire with 4,225 AFSC effectiveness combinations for the research
respondents to subjectively grade (652 = 4,225). A survey this large was deemed
intractable (see Table 3).
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Table 3 – Initial ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions
AFSC
2A551L
2A553A
2A571
2A571L
2A573
2A600
2A651A
2A655
2A671A
2A676
2A691
021A3
021B3
2A051A
2A071A
2A071D
2A300
2A351A
2A352
2A353A
2A353B
2A353J
2A371
2A372
2A373
2A373A
2A373B
2A390
2A551J
2A551K
2A553B
2A553C
2A572

AFS TITLE
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/COM JOURNEYMAN
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MANAGER
AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN
AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
AEROSPACE PROPULSION CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM CRAFTSMAN
AEROSPACE PROPULSION SUPERINTENDENT
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER
AVIONICS TEST STATION AND COMPUTER JOURNEYMAN
AVIONICS TEST STATION & COMPUTER CRAFTSMAN
AVIONICS TEST STATION & COMPUTER CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SUPERINTENDENT
A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN
A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE F-15 JOURNEYMAN
TACTICAL MAINTENANCE F-16/F-117 JOURNEYMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE GENERAL JOURNEYMAN
A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS CRAFTSMAN
F16/F117/R21/CV22 AVIONICS CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SUPERINTENDENT
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/INS JOURNEYMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/ELECTRONIC WARFARE JOURNEYMAN
HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN

AFSC
2A573A
2A573B
2A573C
2A590
2A651A
2A651B
2A652
2A654
2A655
2A656
2A671A
2A671B
2A672
2A673
2A674
2A675
2A676
2A690
2A753
2A754
2A773
2A774
2E171
2E271
2M071
2W051
2W071
2W151
2W171
2W251
2W271
3A051

AFS TITLE
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/COM CRAFTSMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/INS CRAFTSMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS ELECTRONIC WARFARE CRAFTSMAN
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT
AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN
AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN
AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN
AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
ENGINE MANAGER
AEROSPACE PROPULSION CRAFTSMAN
AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT EGRESS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT HYDRAULICS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
AEROSPACE SYSTEMS SUPERINTENDENT
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN
SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT CRAFTSMAN
SATELLITE, WIDEBAND, & TELEMETRY SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
COMPUTER NETWORK S&C SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
MISSILE/SPC SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
MUNITIONS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
MUNITIONS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS JOURNEYMAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CRAFTSMAN
INFORMATION SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN

Functionally Shaping the ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions
To functionally shape the AFSC effectiveness grading matrix, we needed to pare
down the candidate list of AFSCs to a more manageable number. First, all AFSCs not
relevant to the QA inspection process (functional check flight pilot, maintenance officer,
and administrative positions) were eliminated. We then aggregated all AFSCs
functionally by combining the five- and seven-skill levels (Technician and Craftsman
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respectively) for each AFS (AF Specialty) and nine- and zero-skill level (Superintendent
and Chief Master Sergeant Chief Enlisted Manager Code) within each AFS. This
decreased the master ACC aircraft QA AFSC list to 47 different AFSCs which equated to
2,209 individual AFSC effectiveness combinations for the first sub-phase (472 = 2,209).
This was also determined to be unmanageable. To further decrease the number of AFSCs
on the list, AFSC shredouts (identifies special weapons systems or skills required for a
position) were eliminated to standardize AFSCs. This last cut created a master ACC
aircraft quality assurance AFSC list of 24 different AFSCs for a sub-phase count of 570
individual AFSC effectiveness combinations (242 = 570). Although still a large number,
we determined that any further aggregation would result in too broad of categories to
effectively work with (see Table 4).
Table 4 – Resultant ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions
AFSC
2A0X1
2A3X0
2A3X1
2A3X2
2A3X3
2A590
2A5X1
2A5X2
2A5X3
2A6X0
2A6X1
2A6X2
2A6X3
2A6X4
2A6X5
2A6X6
2A7X3
2A7X4
2E1X1
2E2X1
2M0X1
2W0X1
2W1X1
2W2X1

AFS TITLE
AVIONICS TEST STATION AND COMPUTER JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SUPERINTENDENT
A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE F-15 JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT (NON-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT)
AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/INS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MANAGER
AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT EGRESS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT HYDRAULICS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
SATELLITE, WIDEBAND, & TELEMETRY SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
COMPUTER NETWORK S&C SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
MISSILE/SPC SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
MUNITIONS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
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The derived master ACC aircraft maintenance QA AFSC list was then sent to
each of the ACC aircraft maintenance QA units to validate that it did in fact contain all of
their authorized AFSCs at the aggregate level. All ACC aircraft QA units responded
affirmatively and we determined the master list to be acceptable. This ACC aircraft QA
AFSC master list containing the 24 aggregated AFSCs was then used to develop a crosscombination grading matrix and a web-based survey (see Appendix A).
Composing the Delphi Panel of Experts
To gain a list of potential survey respondents with the required background to
participate as qualified members of the Delphi Panel of Experts, a list of QA and
maintenance group leaders obtained from ACC/LGQ was used as a seed to send out the
request for volunteers. The rationale for this is that these personnel, due to their position,
were considered good candidates as subject matter experts on the aircraft maintenance
and quality assurance functions under study. The researcher then sent out a focused call
to each of these personnel via e-mail asking for volunteers.
To further ensure a representative view across all ACC aircraft maintenance units,
a basic objective was set to attain a minimum of two senior leaders from each unit to
participate on the Delphi panel of experts. Also, each of the potential respondents was
vetted to ensure they possessed a minimum of six years of experience in the aircraft
maintenance field. Respondents who did not meet this requirement were not used on the
Delphi panel of experts for the two-part surveys. The demographics of the volunteers
who were ultimately accepted for the panel appear in Table 5.

39

Initial Group

Table 5 – Delphi Panel of Experts Demographic Data – Initial List
Rank

Number in Rank

Lt Colonel
Major
Captain
CMSgt
SMSgt
Totals

2
2
3
28
10
45

Average Number Years
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance
Experience
22
12
9
24
18
21.0

The Two-Part Survey Using the DELPH Technique
Survey, Part-1
A two-part, web-based survey was developed to send out to the Delphi panel of
experts. The specific objective in Survey, Part-1, was to answer the Investigative
Question: “Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most affected by an empty QA
manning position or a mismatch?” It was designed to elicit a cognitive view from experts
in the aircraft maintenance field on how they saw the impact that they perceived the
aircraft/munitions quality assurance function had on a candidate list of the more visible
wing- and unit-level metrics as determined by the researcher. Survey, Part-1’s
instructions asked the respondents to rate each of fifteen candidate metrics on a six-point
LIKERT scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (see Table 6 and Appendix A).
The respondents were also encouraged to provide additional metrics they felt were
impacted by the performance of the quality assurance function. Each question also
included an area for the respondents to comment on their ratings if they so desired.
It should be noted that we chose to use a six-point LIKERT scale without a neutral option
in order to eliminate fence-sitting and to “force” an answer. Additionally, we performed
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only one round of Survey, Part-1 because the basic intent of this sub-phase was to gain a
candidate list of metrics to use in Phase-Three of the study. Both of these decisions
supported this objective.
Table 6 – Survey, Part-1 Rating Scale
Rating Scale
Descriptor
Rating
1
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
2
Somewhat Disagree
3
Somewhat Agree
4
Agree
5
Strongly Agree
6

% Effect
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%

As a quality control measure and to uncover problems and/or inconsistencies, the
survey instrument was first Beta-tested on seven Air Force Institute of Technology
students who possessed extensive aircraft maintenance experience (greater than six years
each). Once all reported problems were corrected, the survey instrument was vetted once
again through the thesis committee where two more problems were highlighted and
subsequently corrected. Afterward, the instrument was released to the Air Force Institute
of Technology’s production server and then the web link was sent out to the Delphi
panelists. Table 7 contains demographic data for the Survey, Part-1 respondents. Table 8
is a combined list of metrics submitted by the Delphi panel while Appendixes BU and
BV show response values along with validation determinations for each metric.
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Survey, Part -1

Table 7 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE Panel of Experts Demographic Data
Rank

Number

Lt Colonel
Major
Captain
CMSgt
SMSgt
Totals

1
2
2
22
7
34

Average Number Years
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance
Experience
18
12
9
22.6
18
20.1

Table 8 – Survey, Part-1 Metrics Validated / Not Validated
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Survey, Part-2 – ROUND ONE
Survey, Part-2 was created to answer the Investigative Question: “What is the
effectiveness of a person without the UMD-designated AFSC when performing the QA
duties of another AFSC (how good is the ‘fit’)?” For ROUND ONE of Survey, Part-2, a
web-based instrument was developed and sent out to all Delphi Panel of Experts
members. It consisted of a 28-page survey containing one introduction page, one
instructions page, one demographics page, 24 survey sheets, and one closure page. The
heart of Survey, Part-2 was the 24 AFSC effectiveness grading sheets.
As a quality control measure and to uncover problems and/or inconsistencies, the
survey instrument was first Beta-tested on seven Air Force Institute of Technology
students who possessed extensive aircraft maintenance experience (i.e. greater than six
years each). Once all reported problems were corrected, the survey instrument was
vetted once again through the thesis committee where four more problems were
highlighted and subsequently corrected. The instrument was then released to the Air
Force Institute of Technology’s production server and afterward the link was sent out to
the Delphi panel of experts.
Each Delphi panelist was asked to systematically rate, on a scale of one to five
(correlating to a scale of 0 to 100 percent in 20-point increments), how effective a person
possessing the AFSC in each row appearing down the left column on each page could be
expected to perform the duties and tasks of the QA manning position listed on the top of
each sheet. It was expressly explained in the instructions to the respondents that they
were to rate the effectiveness of an average person possessing each designated AFSC
performing QA duties, not the normal flight line or back shop maintenance tasks
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performed by technicians. Once all ROUND ONE responses were received from the
panel members, they were compiled, aggregated, and statistically averaged.
Because the Delphi panel consisted of high-ranking and critically-placed
maintainers and leaders, their ability to dedicate two to three hours to a survey became a
problem for many of them and thus, Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE took over three
months to complete. Furthermore, although a comments section was provided for on this
part of the web-based survey, there were no comments provided from the panel. Based
on e-mail and phone responses from panelists, it was concluded that this was caused by
two phenomena: the first cause for a lack of comments on ROUND ONE was that the
survey fostered this type of response due to its length (requiring 570 individual
responses) even though the survey enabled the panel member to stop and start again later
where they left off. The second causal factor for getting no comments back was that the
questions asked for the respondents to rate manning effectiveness based on experience.
With the high caliber of individuals on the panel and the straightforwardness of the
survey instrument, it is understandable that the panelists determined that they did not
need to defend an opinion in the absence of dissent (i.e. there were no dissenting views in
Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE). Table 9 contains a snapshot of the demographics of the
Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE respondents.
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Survey, Part -2 ROUND
ONE

Table 9 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE Panel of Experts Demographic Data
Rank

Number

Lt Colonel
Major
Captain
CMSgt
SMSgt

2
2
2
19
7

Average Number Years
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance
Experience
22
12
9
24
18

Totals

32

20.9

However, due to the extensive amount of time required to accomplish Survey,
Part-2 ROUND ONE, it was obvious that Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO needed to be
structured in a more streamlined fashion. Using the coefficient of variation (CV)
discriminator method gave us the ability to compare the variation of two or more
different variables and provides a standardized view of variability across all 570
responses to gain a better understanding of the variability present in the data. The
following is the formula for computing the population coefficient of variation:
PopulationCV=

σ
μ

(note: σ = standard deviation; µ = mean).

CV thresholds between 0 and 1.0 were iteratively applied to all 570 panel mean
data responses in an attempt to come up with a test factor that would illuminate the “Fail”
responses (indicating a lack of agreement among the experts) that would be needed to be
addressed by the panel in ROUND TWO due to variability present in the responses.
However, even at the lowest CV test factor, there were still over 500 individual responses
which were a “fail”. After carefully analyzing the data, a CV factor of 0.29 was
determined as an appropriate “trip-wire” even though this still created a ROUND TWO
comprised of 529 individual responses that failed the ROUND ONE. We then used these
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“fails” to develop a spreadsheet-based instrument to use in Survey, Part-2 – ROUND
TWO.
Survey, Part-2 – ROUND TWO
In ROUND TWO of Survey, Part-2, a spreadsheet was sent out to each Delphi
panelist for them to compare their ratings with the aggregated ratings of the Delphi panel
as a whole. This spreadsheet included a matrix with all group means (this matrix placed
at the bottom of the spreadsheet), a matrix with the respondent’s responses from ROUND
ONE (this matrix placed in the middle of the spreadsheet), and a changeable matrix with
blacked out cells that were not statistically different from ROUND ONE (this matrix was
placed at the top of the spreadsheet). Additionally, to make it easier for the panelist to
navigate within the matrix without having to continually refer to the attached AFMAN
36-2108 AFSC Duty Description page (see Appendix CL), each ratable cell within the
spreadsheet included an imbedded comment describing exactly what the panelists were
being asked to rate (e.g. Egress Sys Jymn/Crftmn effectiveness in MX Supt, Non-Tac
Acft QA Position). Lastly, a “comments” section was provided on the bottom of the
grading sheet to give each panelist the opportunity to provide feedback (see Appendix E).
Respondents were instructed to analyze the aggregated manning effectiveness
matrix derived from ROUND ONE and any comments provided by other panel members.
If, after viewing the data, they wished to modify any of their ROUND ONE ratings, the
panelist was instructed to fill in their ratings in the top matrix then send the completed
file back to the researcher. This was considered their Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO
response (See Table 10). Of the 14 responses received from respondents in ROUND
TWO, thirteen modified their ROUND ONE responses in varying degrees while one
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panelist held fast on his ROUND ONE responses. Also, only one panelist provided
comments (see Table 11). Table 12 is a demographic snapshot of the 14 respondents in
Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO. The data responses from ROUND TWO were then used
as a basis to develop the Aircraft Maintenance QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix. (Note:
It was determined from e-mail and telephonic responses from the majority of members on
the Delphi panel to the researcher, that a third round of the Delphi technique would result
in no further adjustment to their individual ratings, and thus would be counterproductive
to the effort).
Table 10 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Initial Response – QA Effectiveness
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Table 11 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Panel of Experts’ Comments
Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Comments

I was fully satisfied with the original percentages.
I have worked with “out of limits” inspectors before at Base X and Prince Sultan Air
Base, Saudi Arabia. Their ability to perform was adequately captured in the 1-5 scale
you gave.
I believe that QA is a meter of the maintenance being done, and not a
driver…therefore, no matter how well (or poorly) QA does their job, maintenance
indicators will not be dramatically affected (either good or bad).
It is imperative that the best match possible be made to ensure the Commanders get the
best picture of the job being done…additionally we must not skimp on manning the
slots.
I know in this day and age of force shaping, my opinion runs against the current, but we
have reached a point where you can’t cut anymore without affecting the quality of
maintenance. The use of technology is all well and good, and the inclusion of “less
maintenance intense” aircraft is a step in the right direction (remember the F-15 self
diagnostics and the B-1 central integrated test system) nothing will replace the right
number of well qualified Airmen.

Survey, Part -2 ROUND
TWO

Table 12 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Panel of Experts Demographic Data
Rank

Number

Lt Colonel
Major
Captain
CMSgt
SMSgt
Totals

1
1
1
8
3
14

Average Number Years
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance
Experience
18
15
9
24
18
20.4

As is the case in many studies using the Delphi method, the variability in
responses can create problems when trying to gain utility from the data. But, the
variability in itself is good – it accurately reflects reality. These differences of opinion
exist in leadership and management levels throughout the Air Force and are one of the
motivators behind making things happen. For, if everyone thought exactly alike,
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creativity and ingenuity would be stifled. This variability only strengthens results. But
how do we best handle it to gain the utility we spoke of earlier?
In the case of the AFSC manning effectiveness rates determined by two Delphi
rounds, there was variability, and, to get a usable worker effectiveness matrix, we needed
to determine how to treat the data. First, since we did not want to mix data sets, we only
used data from panelists who responded to both ROUNDs ONE and TWO. Next we
adopted a low, medium, high approach to ensure that the variability of the data was
properly addressed in the QA manning effectiveness matrix. To accomplish this, three
separate and distinct matrixes were derived utilizing the statistical quartile approach (i.e.
one matrix based on quartile-one, one matrix based on quartile-two, and one matrix based
on quartile-three) to be used in Phase-Two. These matrixes were then applied toward the
resultant manning derived from Phase-Two. This was the conclusion of Phase-One of the
research study and the input to Phase-Two.
Phase Two of the Study
Determining How ACC Units Have Manned Their QA Flights
In Phase Two we need to answer the question: “How have ACC aircraft wings
historically manned their aircraft QA manning positions” (i.e. we need to quantify the
manning fit in relation to the UMD)? To answer this, a spreadsheet was developed (see
Appendix F) and sent to each of the 16 selected ACC QA flights for them to provide a
24-month view of their historical manning (see Table 13).
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Table 13 – List of Participating ACC Bases/Units in Study
ACC Units in Study
Barksdale AFB (2 BW)
Minot AFB (5 BW)
Beale AFB (9 RW)
Mountain Home AFB (366 FW)
Cannon AFB (27FW)
Nellis AFB (57 FW)
Davis-Monthan AFB (355 FW) Offutt AFB (55 RW)
Dyess AFB (7 BW)
Pope AFB (28 FG)
Ellsworth AFB (28 BW)
Seymour-Johnson AFB (4 FW)
Holloman AFB (49 FW)
Shaw AFB (20 FW)
Langley AFB (1 FW)
Whiteman AFB (509 BW)

Specifically, each ACC QA flight was asked to fill in the provided spreadsheet
with an authorized AFSC and an assigned AFSC for each manpower position on their
UMD, by month, from January 2003 to December 2004. The completed and returned
ACC unit UMD spreadsheets along with the Aircraft Maintenance QA Manning
Effectiveness Matrix derived in Phase-One were then used to compute an overall quality
assurance effectiveness percentage of aggregated assigned manning for each ACC QA
flight by month.
Comparing MXG Manning with QA Flight Manning Effectiveness
In order to address a large issue with the data, monthly assigned and authorized
manning levels for maintenance AFSCs assigned to each of the ACC units’ Maintenance
Groups (MXG) under study were requested from ACC/DPIM. However, due to
computer database limitations at ACC/DPIM, acquiring a complete historical
representation of assigned manning at the units under study for the entire timeframe was
impossible. Therefore, only monthly manning data from January 2004 to December 2004
was available. Furthermore, since gathering the data by AFSC to the five significant
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digit-level would be an expensive manpower drain on ACC/DPIM resources, only
aggregated AFSC data for the 2A, 2E, 2M and 2W AFS’s at the two-digit level was
requested. The retrieved data was then paired down to AFS’s that significantly impacted
the study (2A’s and 2W’s). This was considered sufficient since the 2E and 2M AFS’s
comprised less than 0.08 percent of overall assigned QA manpower for all authorized
AFS’s and were found at only two of the participating units in the study.
Once the manning data was received, it was parsed to eliminate assigned and
authorized three-levels AFSCs from the data in order to ensure only those AFSCs and
skill levels normally assigned to ACC QA flights (i.e. 5-, 7-, 9-, and 0-level AFSCs) were
counted. Next, all assigned and all authorized manning for both of the two focal AFS’s
(i.e. 2A plus 2W assigned; 2A plus 2W authorized) were summed for each unit under
study. We then calculated a ratio of overall assigned-to-authorized by unit, by month, to
gain an understanding into each unit’s overall manning structure. Although this overall
MXG manning data covered only half of the timeframe covered by the study for our
computed QA manning effectiveness data, it still provided limited, but valuable insight
into the manning practice of the units under study.
Phase-Three of the Study
In Phase Three we compiled data from each of the units in the key unit- and winglevel metrics areas indicated by the Delphi panel of experts in Survey, Part-1 in PhaseOne of the study for the timeframe, January 2003 to December 2004. Specifically, we
gathered only maintenance-related historical flying safety data (Class A, B, C from the
Air Force Safety Center) and maintenance-related ground safety data (Class A, B, C, and
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Other from the HQ/ACC Ground Safety Office). Furthermore, we acquired QA metrics
from each of the unit’s QA flights under study (i.e. various inspection pass rates), and
Foreign Object Damage (FOD) along with Dropped Object (DOP) data from each of the
unit’s FOD/DOP monitors. Lastly, we accumulated the remainder of the key unit metrics
from the units’ Maintenance Analysis Flights (i.e. Flying Scheduling Effectiveness Rate,
Mission Capable Rate, Repeat Rate, Recur Rate, etc.).
We next applied the results of Phase-Two (e.g. calculated QA flight manning
effectiveness) to all of the participating maintenance units that had differing overall QA
manning effectiveness levels to the gathered data. We first performed a Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficient analysis between each of the indicated metrics
(i.e. Mission Capable Repeat, FOD/DOP, Mishaps, etc.) to the calculated QA manning
effectiveness rate for each participating unit in an effort to determine any existing
bivariate relationships. We then performed a regression analysis between the QA
manning effectiveness rates and each of the indicated metrics across all participating
ACC units.
Phase-Four of the Study
Phase-Four completed the study by answering Investigative Question-3: “What is
the relationship between QA flight manning effectiveness and the key unit- and winglevel metrics?” This was accomplished by analyzing and evaluating the statistical results
to derive any practical usefulness to aircraft maintenance managers making QA manning
decisions. Using these results, we then performed a sample benefit-cost analysis. And
lastly, the statistical results were analyzed in an attempt to validate what the experts in the
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field felt the impact that QA as an entity has on key unit- and wing-level metrics. This
was performed by comparing the experts’ responses in Phase-One, Survey, Part-1 and the
statistical measures derived from Phase-Three to determine where they matched, and
where they differed.
Scope and Limitations of Research Study
Data Collection Issues
There were several instances where units chose not collect certain types of
optional metric data (e.g. one unit does not collect Phase Key Task List Pass rate data
separately from Quality Verification Pass rate data). To handle this, we used statistical
tools such as pair-wise analysis versus list-wise analysis. Also, one unit could not give
the full 24-month QA assigned manning look-back which we also handled with pair-wise
analysis.
About Correlation and Regression Analysis
When considering the correlation analysis, it frequently may not be appropriate to
consider the X-values as known constants whereas correlation analysis provides an
avenue to infer relationships between variables without risking errors associated with
confidence coefficients (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li, 2004). In our procedures, we
attempted to derive any existing significant correlation and direction between the
indicated overall QA flight manning effectiveness levels and each of the indicated
metrics. The results of this analysis were used to draw conclusions and postulate
potential mitigating strategies for maintenance leaders and managers to use when
assigning personnel to QA Flight manpower positions in the final phase of the study.
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Addressing Potential Problems with Self-Reports
Padsakoff and Organ identified six categories of self-report (i.e. a survey is a selfreport), presented circumstances where problems may manifest, and discussed methods
for mitigating these problems. The six identified categories of self-report are:
1) Obtaining demographic or otherwise factual data (such as age or sex of
respondent, years of tenure, etc.), that are, in principle, verifiable form other
sources.
2) Assessing the effectiveness of experimental manipulations.
3) Gathering personality data (trait, anxiety, need for achievement, locus of control,
and so forth).
4) Obtaining descriptions of a respondent’s past or characteristic behavior (e.g.,
asking supervisors about there “structuring” behaviors), and/or seeking
respondent’s intentions of future behavior (e.g., to quit), or how they would
behave under certain hypothetical conditions (i.e., various role-playing
exercises).
5) Scaling the psychological states of respondents, such as job attitudes, tension, or
motivation.
6) Soliciting respondents’ perceptions of an external environmental variable (the
supervisor’s behavior, formalization of organizational processes, climate)
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1985).
For our surveys, we need to address category ‘1’ since we gathered demographic data on
our respondents for the purpose of verifying their status as maintenance subject matter
experts. Category ‘6’ was also relevant since respondents were asked to provide opinions
on which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most impacted by QA effectiveness along
with how they felt workers would perform under certain circumstances.
When addressing, category-1 problems, we were well assured that the responses
were correct for the two primary data elements: years of aircraft/munitions maintenance
experience and rank. Since all respondents were military personnel, their reported years
of experience can reasonably be expected to coincide closely with the job position they
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held (i.e. a QA maintenance superintendent or a maintenance group chief would most
likely have not risen to that position without substantial experience).
When it came to category-6 issues, we addressed the potential biases inherent in
perception-based surveys. To help control for this, we first ensured not to provide too
much detail to the respondents as to the nature of the survey, beyond providing basic
instructional guidance. In essence, we did not want respondents to know the overall
intent of the study so as to avert the potential that they would overtly or unintentionally
stage their answers in an attempt to bias the survey.
A second issue with our survey, was the shear magnitude of time required to
complete Survey, Part-2 since it was expected (from a beta-test) to take anywhere from
30-minutes to two-hours per respondent, for each round of the Delphi. According to
Padsakaoff, et al., respondents taking long surveys can experience “transient mood
states” where a consistent, yet artifactual bias may be introduced across measures. To
control for this, we provided a “Save & Return Later” function in the computer-based
Survey, part II ROUND-ONE. Also, since we conducted Survey, Part II, ROUND-TWO
through a spreadsheet-based instrument, this also allowed respondents to start, save, and
restart as required.
Another issue we addressed is the potential bias attributable to trait, source and
methods. For instance, in our study, a respondent who is a “crew chief by trade” may
have tended to have consistently higher or lower expectations on how effective another
person possessing their same AFSC may perform other jobs (i.e. an electrician
respondent may feel that an average electrician would be more apt to handle any job they
are assigned to well, and thus this may bias their ratings when considering electricians.
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This is because they are experts on electrical systems and the electricians who work
them). However, this particular bias would most likely not exist when these same
personnel are considering workers possessing other AFSCs.
To counteract this potentiality, we provided straightforward and explicit
instructions repeatedly through the Delphi rounds for the respondents to ensure they
considered “average” personnel and also to base their responses on their own experiences
and beliefs (see Delphi instructions in Appendixes A-D).
Lastly, we controlled for this potential bias by ensuring our respondent group was
diverse and varied. In the aggregate, personnel in our respondent group possessed many
different ranks, came from many different AFSC backgrounds (crew chiefs, avionics,
munitions, weapons, structural repair, fuels systems, etc.), worked on different aircraft
and munitions types (bombers, fighters, special assets), and were assigned to many
different bases (see Tables, 5, 7, 10, 12). This good cross-sectional response is
considered to have mitigated any remaining biases. We coupled these strategies, with the
power of the Delphi method to eliminate the “round-table” meeting influence, and
achieved a very robust system of bias-mitigating check and balances.
In the next chapter, we calculate an overall manning effectiveness level by month
for each of the unit‘s QA flight by applying the derived manning effectiveness matrix
from Phase-One of the study to the data acquired from the units under study from PhaseTwo. We will also examine the overall MXG assigned manning as it related to the
calculated QA manning effectiveness levels.
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IV. Results – QA Manning Effectiveness
Overview
In this chapter we calculate the overall manning effectiveness for each of the QA
flights and then perform an analysis of Maintenance Group (MXG) assigned manning as
it relates to this effectiveness.
Our Assumptions
The following assumptions were used in evaluating results in Chapters IV and V:
1) The Unit Manning Document requirements are the optimum manning needs to
create the best mix of maintenance oversight and worker capability.
2) The models we create are interpretive, not predictive.
3) The models we create provide a broad view across all participating units and may
or may not be indicative of a hard and fast rule applicable to all units.
4) Although we understand that QA personnel are pulled from the larger
Maintenance Group (MXG) manning pool, we will not attempt to model the
dichotomy of tradeoffs caused by this action (i.e. what would be the opportunity
cost of pulling a technician off the flight line and put them in a QA position?).
5) All quantitative monetary analyses assume a person is hired into the MXG and a
technician from the MXG manning pools possessing the required six months
time-on-station, is then assigned to QA.
6) Once a person is assigned to a manpower position at a unit, there is a one-month
lag between their arrival at the duty station and them becoming a viable asset to
the unit.

7) All persons possessing the AFS’s in the reported manning data are fully capable,
are assigned as assets under the MX Group manning structure, and are not
performing duties outside of their AFS (e.g. Dormitory Chief, Honor Guard, etc.).
Table 19 and Figure 12 examine this correlation.
Calculating Manning Effectiveness Levels for QA Flights
After examining all of the historically assigned manning lists from each of the QA
flights, we discovered several instances where AFSCs other than those that were
authorized by the aggregated ACC Unit Manning Document (UMD) from Phase-One,
were being used in QA flights. This created a problem where we needed to go back to
the Delphi Panel to get them to evaluate the effectiveness of each of these ten newly
uncovered AFSC combinations.
We then took the outcome of the first Delphi study, and after examining the
resultant matrix, determined that the range of values for each AFSC combination (i.e. the
1st to 3rd quartile range) was relatively small for the majority of AFSC combinations
within the matrix. Using this as a guide, we determined the median value for each AFSC
combination was the appropriate effectiveness rating to apply to any AFSC-mismatch
encountered in actual QA manning data received from the field (see Table 14).
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Table 14 – Results of Initial and Supplemental Delphi Survey – AFSC Combinations

Next, we formatted each of the 16 returned QA flight historical manning charts and
assigned the proper effectiveness rating for each manpower position reported by month,
for each unit. When assigning effectiveness ratings to each authorized position, we used
the following four-rule process:
1) If an authorized QA manpower position was filled with a person possessing the
AFSC called for in the UMD, the position effectiveness was rated 100 percent
effective (e.g. a worker with AFSC 2A5X3 assigned to a 2A5X3 QA position).
2) If the person filling a QA position possessed an AFSC other than that called for in
the UMD, the appropriate effectiveness level derived from the QA manning
effectiveness charts was assigned to that position (e.g. a person with AFSC
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2A5X3 assigned to a 2A5X1 QA position would be rated 41 percent effective as
derived from the QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix).
3) Instances where UMD manpower positions were double-filled (i.e. two persons
possessing AFSC 2A3X3 were assigned against one UMD-authorized 2A3X3
manpower position), were rated as 100 percent effective. The rationale for this
was that, although not authorized for in the UMD, these “extra” personnel provide
capability and more capability “should be better”, thus proper credit should be
applied to possibly offset deficiencies in other areas.
4) All unfilled QA positions were rated as zero percent effective.
Once all individual QA manpower positions were assigned manning effectiveness
ratings, a simple average was computed for each month to determine each QA flight’s
overall manning effectiveness rating. As mentioned earlier, this process was repeated for
all individual QA positions, by month, for all participating QA flights (see Table 15 for
an example on how monthly QA effectiveness is calculated; see Appendixes BK-1 to BZ2 for all participating units’ calculated QA effectiveness tables).
Table 15 – Excerpt Example of Assigned Unit QA Manpower by Position, by Month
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Table 16 – QA Flight Calculated Manning Effectiveness for Participating Bases

In the next step we aggregate the monthly manning effectiveness sores for all
participating QA flights into one chart to develop our time-series (see Table 16).
Analyzing the Manning Effectiveness Levels for QA Flights
The calculated manning effectiveness levels in Table 16 reveal that all but two
units experienced transitory fluctuations in manning effectiveness from month-to-month
(one had a stable 100 percent calculated QA manning effectiveness and the other had a
stable 95 percent effectiveness score for the entire timeframe of the study). Although the
stable effectiveness levels is desirable in daily practice, it does however create a
confound for this study because we are searching for links associated with QA manning

61

effectiveness variability. If the independent variable (i.e. a unit’s calculated QA manning
effectiveness levels) never changes, then any variability in the dependant metric variable
data (e.g. Mission Capable rate, Repeat rate, Mishap counts) merely becomes noise.
Comparing Manning for MX Groups to Calculated QA Effectiveness
Since all QA manning is taken from the larger Maintenance Group (MXG)
manpower structure, its manpower is dependant upon available MXG manning. Thus, it
is necessary to analyze the overall MXG manning in order to gain an understanding into
the QA manning construct and the cross-impacts involved. Furthermore, the capability of
acquiring the assigned historical MXG manning at the participating units was hampered
by limited access to the data and manpower resources at the headquarters level.
However, we were able to accumulate and calculate an assigned/authorized manpower
ratio for the two most prevalent AFS’s (2A and 2W) found in the QA flights in the study
for the timeframe January 2004 to December 2004 (see Table 17).
Table 17 – MXG Derived 2A and 2W Manning for Participating Bases
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Once we had this data, we performed a Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient analysis to determine the linear relationships between MXG manning and
calculated QA manning effectiveness.
Table 18 – MX Group Assigned Manning Correlated w/ QA Manning Effectiveness

MXG Manning Correlated w/ QA Manning Effectiveness
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Figure 13 – MXG Assigned Manning Correlated w/ QA Manning Effectiveness
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We used a 1-month lag in the analysis (MXG assigned manning in month-j is
correlated with the calculated QA flight manning effectiveness in Month j+1) to account
for individual unit in-processing actions, etc.). From this we found that three units (2
BW, 509 BW, and 49 FW) have a zero-correlation coefficient between their MXG
assigned manning and their QA flight manning effectiveness. This was the expected
result in the case of the 2 BW and the 49 FW since there was no variability in their
calculated QA flight manning effectiveness, while there was in the corresponding MXG
assigned manning data. Next we found that one unit has a weak positive correlation
between MXG assigned manning and QA flight manning effectiveness (28 BW), five
units with a weak-to-moderate negative correlation coefficient (1 FW, 27 FW, 366 FW, 5
BW, and 9 RW), and one unit with a moderate negative correlation coefficient (7 BW).
Lastly, we observed five units with a moderate-to-strong positive correlation between
MXG assigned manning and QA flight manning effectiveness (355 FW, 4 FW, 55 RW,
57 FW), with the 20 FW having a near-perfect correlation (see Table 18 and Figure 13).
Table 19 – Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient Relationships
Correlation
Indication
Resultant Action
Coefficient
Strong Positive
As one variable increases,
-1.0
Relationship
the other variable increases
0.0

No Relationship

None

1.0

Strong Negative
Relationship

As one variable increases,
the other variable
decreases

We performed one further analysis of the MXG assigned manning as it related to
the QA manning effectiveness levels which consisted on counting the number of months
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for all units where MXG assigned manning exceeded QA flight manning effectiveness
and vice-versa. We then took this raw data and converted it to a ratio for all ACC bases.
Table 20 – Relationship between MXG Manning and QA Manning Effectiveness

The data in Table 20 indicate that for approximately 60 percent of the months in Calendar
Year 2004 (using zero-lag), the individual units’ MXG assigned manning for AFS’s 2A
and 2W was less than the calculated QA flight effectiveness, and for approximately 40
percent of the months, MXG assigned manning was more than that of their respective QA
flight’s effectiveness level. This raises an important question associated with this study:
“Should QA manning track that of assigned manning within its respective MXG?” In
other words, should all maintenance functions share equally in the pain when there is a
lack of manning or should low-density, high-demand functions be fully manned? Since
there are different opinions on this, we will table it for now, and revisit it in Chapter VI.
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Basically, the utility of this data to the study is that it paints a rough picture of
how manning is being apportioned by the various units to their QA flights. For instance,
for a unit with a positive correlation, their MXG assigned manning fluctuates in the same
direction as their QA flight manning effectiveness. On the other hand, the negative
correlation for manning is interesting, because this indicates that, as the unit’s assigned
“2A and 2W” percentage of assigned manning changed, the QA manning effectiveness
responded with a change in the opposite direction.
In examining the manning data (see Table 20), this anomaly seems to be caused
more by variability within the MXG assigned data than by changes within the QA flight
manning effectiveness. This may indicate that the lag-factor between when people are
assigned to a maintenance group to when manning structure changes are actually made,
may be more pronounced than just the one-month lag that we modeled.
Table 21 – Example Raw Data used for Correlation Calculations

We need to caution the reader not to draw conclusions based solely on this
correlation data for various reasons. First, this correlation analysis is based on a limited
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sample size of data points for only twelve months of MXG manning. Second, the data
for QA flight manning effectiveness is not a raw number like the MXG assigned manning
data but is rather a calculated percentage based on the derived manning effectiveness
assignment process. Third, manpower at stateside assigned bases follow a “fair-share”
process whereby average worldwide manning levels are used to determine percentages of
manning for each AFSC to be assigned to each of the bases, thus there is no one model
that fits all of the units under study. The last and most important fact to consider before
passing judgment, is the very dynamic nature of the manning assignment process where
maintenance managers make daily manpower determinations based on changing
requirements and constraints.
In the Chapter V we examine the metric data relevant to the calculated QA
manning effectiveness data in order to derive any relevant insights, and in Chapter VI we
present conclusions and recommendations.
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V. Results – Analyzing the Metrics Relevant to QA Manning Effectiveness
Overview
In this chapter we use the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
analysis procedure to investigate relationships between the calculated QA Manning
Effectiveness and subsequent time lags for each of the participating units, versus the
metrics confirmed by the subject matter experts in the Delphi Survey, Part-1. We will
also perform regression analysis to determine any significance between the independent
variable (QA Manning Effectiveness) and each of the dependent variables arrayed across
the 16 ACC units in the study.
The Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient
Mathematically the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is:
r=

SS xy
SS xx SS yy

(note: SS =sums of squares; x=indep. variable; y=dep. variable).

This is a useful mathematical tool for gaining a macro view of linear relationships
between individual data sets. Furthermore, to save time, we will use the statistical
analysis software program JMP® to perform the correlation calculations.
The Process Overview for Analyzing Each Metric, by Variable, by Unit
We will use the “by-metric” approach to analyze each of the indicated metrics.
More specifically, we will analyze each of the 25 metrics in alphabetical order and, under
each of the specific metric headings, we will first define each metric that was indicated
by the Delphi Panel of Experts in Phase-One of the study. We will then use the
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<Multivariate> command in JMP® for each of the metrics (Abort, Mission Capable,
Repeat, Recur, Mishap, etc.) and the QA Manning Effectiveness rates for each of the
units to create a correlation matrix.
This correlation matrix will provide us with correlation strength (linear
relationship) along with the direction of relationship between the variables. Furthermore,
to gain greatest insight into potential lag-relationships between the variables, each metric
will be lagged in monthly increments from zero (contemporaneous) to four (note: a QA
manning effect on a resultant metric after four months will be considered to have
occurred by chance). Next, these correlations will be aggregated and collated by metric
across all 16 participating units to allow us to analyze any recurrent themes. First, it
should be noted that Barksdale AFB and Holloman AFB are not included on any of the
metric correlation analysis tables because the results of the Pearson product-moment
correlation analysis will always indicate a zero correlation across all “Lags”. This is due
to the fact that both units had zero variation in their calculated QA Manning
Effectiveness during the 2003-2004 period and thus zero variability within any of the
measured metrics, will always result in a reported zero correlation coefficient. We will
begin with the Abort Rate metric.

Abort Rate (AR)
The AR metric is a leading indicator of both aircraft reliability and quality of
maintenance performed. It is the percentage of missions aborted in the air and on the
ground. Furthermore, an abort is a sortie that ends prematurely and must be reaccomplished (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.1). The Abort rate is calculated as:
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AR(%)=

Air+GroundAborts
*100
TotalSortiesFlown+GroundAborts

Analyzing the reported Abort rates from ACC/LGP against the calculated QA manning
effectiveness rates indicated that correlations across all bases were not uniform for Abort
rates, however several units had periods of relatively high correlations (> +/- 0.45) (see
Appendix AF). Also, the data seems to indicate a negative correlation for the F-16,
Block 30’s at Cannon AFB starting in Lag-0 and lasting until Lag-3. This makes sense if
the QA Manning Effectiveness was a factor for Aborts (i.e. as Manning Effectiveness
increases, Abort rates decrease = GOOD). This negative relationship also occurred at
Mountain Home F-16, Block 50’s in Lag-2 and -3, and at Pope in Lag-3.
Conversely, the A-10s at Davis-Monthan AFB indicate a moderate positive
correlation for operational and training A-10 units across Lags-0, -1, and -2.
Additionally, five aircraft types at Nellis AFB exhibited positive correlations over several
different lags. This is counter-intuitive, since we would expect Abort rates to decrease if
QA manning effectiveness had a significant impact on this metric.
The overall analysis for the Abort rate metric is that although several of the
individual bases indicate potential value in analyzing Abort rates as related to their
individual QA manning effectiveness levels, the data do not support a determination that
Abort rates can be directly tied to QA manning effectiveness as a potential trend across
ACC bases (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). We will now examine the
Break Rate metric.
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Break Rate (BR)

The BR metric is a leading, flying-related metric and is an indicator of both
aircraft reliability and quality of maintenance performed. It is the percentage of aircraft
that land “Code-3” (unable to complete at least one of its assigned missions) (AFI 21-

101, para 1.10.3.2). It is calculated as:
BR(%)=

NumberSortiesThatLandCode3
*100
TotalSortiesFlown

Analyzing the reported Break rates from ACC/LGP against the calculated QA Manning
Effectiveness rates yielded the results listed in Appendix AH. As the appendix reveals,
correlations across all bases were not uniform for Break rates, with nine bases with at
least one assigned aircraft unit showing a weak to moderate negative correlation (GOOD)
between Break rate and QA manning effectiveness. This makes sense if the QA manning
effectiveness was a factor for Break rates (i.e. as Manning effectiveness increases, Break
rates decrease = GOOD).
Conversely, as was the case with Abort rates, five bases had Break rates in
individual aircraft units with moderate positive correlations between Break rate and QA
manning effectiveness. Again, this is counter-intuitive since, we would expect to see
Break rates to decrease if QA manning effectiveness had a significant impact on this
metric type.
The overall determination is that although several of the individual bases indicate
potential value in analyzing Break rates as related to their individual QA manning
effectiveness, the data do not support an overall determination that Break rates can be
directly tied to QA manning effectiveness as a potential trend across ACC bases (see
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Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The next metric we will examine is the CANN
Rate metric.
Cannibalization (CR) Rate

The CR metric is a leading indicator that reflects the number of cannibalization
(CANN) actions (removal of a serviceable part from an aircraft or engine to replace an
unserviceable part on another aircraft or engine). Since Base Supply relies on the

maintenance shops and depot for replenishment, this indicator can be used in part to
indicate maintenance shop and depot support (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.2). It is calculated
as:
CR(%)=

NumberAircraftEngineCANNS
*100
TotalSortiesFlown

Analyzing the reported CANN rates from ACC/LGP against the calculated QA manning
effectiveness rates yielded the results listed in Appendix AI. As the appendix shows,
correlations across all bases were not uniform for CANN rates, but at eleven of the 14
bases, CANN rates indicated a moderately negative (GOOD) correlation between CANN
rates and QA manning effectiveness for at least one aircraft unit at each base but mainly
concentrated in the Lag-1 to -3 range. This makes sense if QA manning effectiveness is a
factor for CANN Rates (i.e. as QA manning effectiveness increases CANN rates
decrease=GOOD).
Conversely, as was the case with Aborts, eight bases had CANN rates in
individual aircraft units with moderate positive correlations between CANN rates and QA
manning effectiveness. Again, this is counter-intuitive, since we would expect to see
CANN rates decrease if QA manning effectiveness had a significant impact on this
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metric. The overall determination is that there is some evidence at the majority of
maintenance units in the study to indicate potential value in analyzing CANN rates as
related to their individual QA manning effectiveness across ACC bases (see Survey, Part1 Comments, Appendix F). We will now examine the Combined Mishap Count metric.
Combined Mishap (CombMis) Count

The CombMis Count metric is an aggregated count of all Class A, B, and C
Mishaps both for flight and ground that are specifically related to maintenance. Also
included are preventable aviation maintenance-related injuries and incidents that did not
meet the $20,000 minimum reporting criteria. Basically, the Combined Mishap Count is
a measure of the extent that maintainers follow directives. Analyzing the reported
Combined Mishap counts acquired from the Air Force Safety Center and ACC Ground
Safety against QA manning effectiveness rates yielded the results listed in Appendix AO.
As the appendix shows, correlations across all bases were not uniform for Combined
Mishaps counts, but seven of the 14 bases indicated moderate negative correlations with
QA manning effectiveness Rates (GOOD) for Lag-0 to Lag-3. Furthermore, three of the
remaining seven bases indicated a moderate positive correlation between Combined
Mishaps and QA manning effectiveness (BAD) in Lag-0. Although the data do not
support categorizing the negative correlations as a trend across all ACC units under
study, any correlations (positive or negative) of Combined Mishap counts with any other
variable should be promptly examined by maintenance management and the necessary
mitigating strategies implemented (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The next
two metrics, Dropped Object and Foreign Object Damage counts, are examined together
because they are both important indicators of the quality of a base’s maintenance
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practices and are monitored and reported by each base’s Foreign Object Damage
Prevention office.
Dropped Object (DOP) and Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Counts

The DOP and FOD Count metrics are two separate metrics and are aggregated
counts of occurrences of preventable Dropped Object counts and Foreign Object Damage
counts respectively. A Dropped Object is an item that falls off of an aircraft (uncommanded) while in-flight. More specifically, our data only includes those DOPs
attributable to maintenance. A FOD incident is a maintenance-related occurrence of
“preventable” damage caused by a foreign object, or is a lost tool or object that is not
recovered that is considered “preventable” (caused by maintenance or operations
personnel).
Appendix AJ indicates that DOP counts had a low-to-moderate incidence of
negative correlation with QA manning effectiveness at seven of 14 bases during at least
one lag period. Also, FOD counts correlated negatively with QA manning effectiveness
at eight of the 14 bases. The overall analysis of the DOP/FOD count correlations is that
the data suggests there is an overall low-to-moderate linear link with QA manning
effectiveness rates. We will next perform a correlation analysis between Material
Deficiency Report counts submitted and QA manning effectiveness rates.
Deficiency Reports (DR) Count

The count of DRs submitted measures the number of instances technicians file
material deficiency reports on defective parts. More DRs submitted is considered better
because this suggests that maintenance personnel are being proactive in trying to resolve
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parts-related trends. Thus, a positive correlation with QA manning effectiveness is
considered GOOD and a negative correlation, BAD.
Examining the data in Appendix AK, we find that four of the 14 bases have a
moderate positive correlation between DR counts and QA manning effectiveness during
at least one lag period, and that eight of the 14 bases have a moderately negative
correlation during at least one lag period. The overall correlation analysis of data for
DRs Submitted counts does not support an ACC-wide trend but may indicate local trends
for some of the bases. We now perform a correlation analysis between the count of
Detected Safety Violation Counts and QA manning effectiveness rates.
Detected Safety Violations (DSV) Count

The DSV Count metric is solely a QA function. These are counts of instances
where individuals are observed by QA personnel committing unsafe acts (e.g. a person
standing on the top step of an A-frame ladder, or not wearing protective eyewear when
handling caustic liquids). Although a low count of detected safety violations is
intuitively a good thing, more QA manning effectiveness may not always translate into
lower incidents. There are two ways to interpret these phenomena: (1) the more effective
QA flight will catch deficiencies quicker and more often and thus a higher count will
result; (2) the more effective QA flight will tend to deter these personnel from taking
shortcuts and thus the DSV count will be less. Thus, both views can be considered
correct. Now we will proceed to the analysis.
The data in the correlation table in Appendix AM for DSV counts reveals twelve
of 14 bases with low-to-moderate correlations between DSV counts and QA manning
effectiveness rates (four positively correlated and eight negatively correlated). And,
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since the QA management team at the unit-level sets the tone for how to deal with DSVs,
we cannot make a GOOD/BAD ruling from the limited data we have. However, we can
make a reasonable observation and say that the data seem to support the postulate that
DSV counts are correlated across ACC bases as a function of QA manning effectiveness
(see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The next metric we will examine is the Fix
Rate metric.
Fix Rate (FR) Metric

The FR metric is a leading indicator showing how well the repair process is being
managed and is an excellent tool for tracking “dead time” in aircraft repair processes
because it measures the speed of repair and equipment maintainability (AFI 21-101, para

1.10.3.6). The FR is the percentage of aircraft landing with failures that are returned to
flyable status within a designated time standard (either 4, 8, or 12-hours depending on the
type of aircraft). The mathematical formula is:
FR(%) =

Code3BreaksFixedWithinX-Hours
*100
TotalCode3Breaks

This is another metric that elicits dichotomous views from people on how an effective
QA flight impacts Fix rates. On the one hand, it is thought that a more effective QA will
result in a quicker fix time because technicians will tend to follow technical data more
closely. The opposing view is that a more effective QA flight will be more visible, and
thus tend to slow repair processes because technicians will take their time and thus take
fewer short cuts to ensure they are not making mistakes or missing steps.
The data in the correlation table in Appendix AH for Fix rates reveals 14 of 14
bases with low-to-moderate correlations between Fix rates and QA manning effectiveness
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rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period (ten
positively correlated and four negatively correlated). And, since the local QA
management sets the tone for how they deal with technicians working jobs, we cannot
make a GOOD/BAD ruling from the limited data we have. However, we can make a
reasonable observation that the data seems to support the postulate that Fix rates are
correlated across ACC bases as a function of QA manning effectiveness (see Survey,
Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The next metric we will examine is Flying Schedule
Effectiveness (FSE) Rate.
Flying Scheduling Effectiveness (FSE) Rate

The FSE Rate metric is a leading indicator and measures how well the unit
planned and executed the weekly flying schedule. Deviations that decrease the FSE from
100 percent include: scheduled sorties not flown because of maintenance, supply,
operations, HHQ, air traffic control, or other causes. This measure is important because
disruptions to the flying schedule can cause turmoil on the flight line and create ripple
affects throughout other agencies (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.7). The mathematical

formula for FSE is:
FSE(%) =

AdjustedSortiesScheduledMinusChargeableDeviations
*100
AdjustedSortiesScheduled

The data in Appendix AN reveal ten of 14 bases exhibited low-to-moderate positive
correlations between FSE rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in at least one of
their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period and eight bases exhibited
moderate negative correlations between FSE rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in
at least one assigned aircraft unit. An overall analysis does not support an ACC-wide
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trend for a correlation between FSE rates and QA manning effectiveness levels but
several bases indicate a potential relationship (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix
F). The next metric we will examine is In-Flight Emergency Rate.
In-Flight Emergency (IFE) Rate

The IFE Rate metric is not tracked by all ACC units (in this study SeymourJohnson and Whiteman do not). Although not considered a primary metric, it is
nonetheless an important one. The mathematical formula is:
IFE(%) =

NumberInFlightEmergencies
*100
NumberSortiesFlown

First, when it comes to the IFE Rate metric, it is intuitive that fewer is better and thus we
would want to see a negative correlation (i.e. a higher QA effectiveness rate with a lower
IFE rate – GOOD). The data in Appendix AP shows that seven of eleven bases that track
IFEs exhibit low-to-moderate negative correlations between IFE rates and QA manning
effectiveness rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag
period, and six bases exhibit moderate positive correlations between IFE rates and QA
manning effectiveness rates in at least one assigned aircraft unit during at least one lag
period. An overall analysis does not support an ACC-wide trend for a correlation
between IFE rates and QA manning effectiveness levels but several bases indicate a
potential relationship. The next metric we will examine is the Key Task List Pass Rate
metric.
Key Task List (KTL) Pass Rate Metric

The KTL Pass Rate metric is a direct output of QA. KTLs are QA maintenance
inspections on tasks that are complex or that affect safety of flight. Each time
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maintenance accomplishes a KTL task, they must notify QA to respond. It should be
noted that although QA has directive authority to waiver their evaluation on a KTL item
on a limited basis, a waiver is a rare exception (as it should be). The mathematical
formula for the KTL Pass rate is:
KTLPass(%)=

NumberKTLinspectionsPassed
*100
NumberKTLinspectionsPerformed

In the realm of KTL pass rates relative to QA manning effectiveness, there are again two
perspectives: (1) a more effective QA flight will be tougher when performing these
critical inspections and thus the KTL Pass rate would be expected at least initially to be
lower, and (2) the more effective QA Flight will influence the maintainers to take their
time and be more thorough performing tasks before calling QA out to inspect their work
and thus the KTL Pass rate should be higher. When analyzing the data in the correlation
table in Appendix AR, we find nine of the 13 bases that track KTLs separately
experienced moderate positive correlations between KTL Pass rates and QA manning
effectiveness rates and four bases had low-to-moderate negative KTL Pass rate
correlations with QA manning effectiveness. Additionally, what is interesting about
these correlations is that most of them track fairly consistently across lags. As for the
overall analysis for an ACC-wide trend for a relationship between KTL Pass rates and
QA manning effectiveness, there is a dichotomy of results with some bases being
positively correlated and some being negatively correlated which is possibly a function of
local QA management strategies (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). We will
now examine the Mission Capable Rate metric.
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Mission Capable (MC) Rate

The MC Rate metric is a lagging indicator and represents a broad composite of
many process and metrics. According to AFI 21-101, maintenance managers
experiencing a low MC rate should look for workers deferring work to other shifts,
inexperienced workers, lack of parts from supply, poor in-shop scheduling, highcannibalization rates, or training deficiencies (para 1.10.3.11). Furthermore, a 2001 Air

Force Institute of Technology thesis supported the fact that low manpower effectiveness
at the worker level is a strong predictor of lower MC rates (Oliver, 2001). But how do
the MC rates correlate with QA manning effectiveness rates? The mathematical formula
for the MC Rate metric is (note: B-type hours are depot-maintenance hours)
MC(%)=

FullyMissionCapableHours+PartialMissionCapableHours-BtypeHours
*100
PossessedHours

The data reveal ten of 14 bases exhibited moderate positive correlations between MC
rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units
during at least one lag period (see Appendix AG). Furthermore, six bases exhibited lowto-moderate negative correlations between MC rates and QA manning effectiveness rates
in at least one assigned aircraft unit during at least one lag period. An overall analysis
does not support an ACC-wide trend for a correlation between MC rates and QA
manning effectiveness levels but several bases do indicate a potential relationship. The
next metric we will examine is Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness Rate metric.
Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness (MSE) Rate

The MSE Rate is a leading indicator and measures the unit’s ability to plan and
complete inspections and periodic maintenance on-time according to the maintenance
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plan. A low MSE rate may indicate a unit is experiencing turbulence on the flight line or
in the maintenance shops (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.10). The mathematical calculation is:

MSE(%) =

NumberScheduledMaintenanceActionsCompletedOnTime
*100
TotalNumberMaintenacneActionsScheduled

The data in Appendix AN reveal nine bases with low-to-moderate-to-high positive
correlations between MSE rates and QA manning effectiveness rates with six bases
having low-to-moderate negative correlations. Due to the strength of some of these
correlations, the data suggests a potential relationship for MSE rates and QA manning
effectiveness at the majority of ACC bases (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).
The next metric we will examine is Maintenance/Operations Deviations Count metric.
Maintenance/Operations Deviations (MX/Ops Devs) Count

Although the MX/Ops Devs Count metric is normally a ratio of the number of
chargeable times an aircraft does not meet its take-off window (within specific timing
standards) to the number of sorties scheduled, our data was acquired by counts. Although
the normal mathematical formula is:
MXOpsDev(%)=

NumberMXDeviations+NumberOperationsDeviations
*100 ,
NumberSortiesScheduled

we consider this count data as acceptable for the purposes of our study since we are
performing a “within treatments analysis” (i.e. we are correlating each unit’s counts with
their respective QA manning effectiveness). But what exactly constitutes a MX/Ops
Dev?
A MX/Ops Dev could occur for any number of reasons attributable to either
maintenance or operations (e.g. the pilot may be weather restricted). Furthermore, since
this number is not broken out for maintenance at most of the participating units, our data
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is mixed and thus any results cannot be linked specifically to QA manning effectiveness.
We are including it in the study because it had a greater than fifty percent response
measure as a primary impact metric from the subject matter experts from the Phase-One,
Delphi survey.
The data in Appendix AF reveal nine of 14 bases indicate moderate negative
correlations between MX/Ops Devs counts and QA manning effectiveness rates in at
least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period. Furthermore, eight
bases exhibited low-to-moderate positive correlations between MX/Ops Devs counts and
QA manning effectiveness. An overall analysis does not support an ACC-wide trend for
a correlation between MX/Ops Devs counts and QA manning effectiveness levels but
several bases indicate a potential relationship (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix
F). The next metric we will examine is the Personnel Evaluations Pass Rate metric.
Personnel Evaluations (PE) Pass Rate

The PE Rate is a lagging indicator that measures the ability of personnel to
perform tasks in their duty position. A PE occurs when QA personnel perform an overthe-shoulder evaluation of a technician performing a task or part of a task for which the
technician being inspected is trained and signed off for. Master Sergeant Sansavera, the
Air Education Training representative attached to ACC/HQ Training, stated that the
reported QA pass rate is considered as a key measure of the training effectiveness in the
field (Sansavera, 2005). Thus we are using this as our proxy variable to examine the
potential impact that QA manning effectiveness has on training instead of using other
more traditional measures such as number of personnel in overtime training or Career
Development Course Pass rates. The PE rate is mathematically determined as:
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PEPass(%)=

NumberPersonnelEvaluationsPassed
*100
NumberPersonnelEvaluationAttempted

The data in the PE Pass Rate correlation table in Appendix AQ reveal seven of 14 bases
exhibited moderate to high positive correlations between PE Pass rates and QA manning
effectiveness rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag
period (see Appendix AQ). Furthermore, seven bases exhibited low-to-moderate
negative correlations between PE Pass rates and QA manning effectiveness. An overall
analysis does not support an ACC-wide trend for a correlation between PE Pass rates and
QA manning effectiveness levels but several bases indicate a potential relationship (see
Appendix F). The next metric we will examine is Phase Key Task List Pass rate.
Phase Key Task List (Phase KTL) Pass Rate

The Phase KTL Pass Rate metric is a subset of the overall KTL Pass Rate
examined earlier in this chapter. It is calculated in the same fashion, but is focused solely
on the results of QA inspections performed on aircraft after all maintenance is completed
and before the aircraft rolls out of a phase dock inspection. Since not all bases in the
study perform Phase Dock QA inspections, we aggregated only those bases that track
Phase KTL inspections into this correlations analysis. From the table in Appendix AR,
we find that five of the 13 bases that track Phase KTL Passes experienced moderate
negative correlations between Phase KTL Pass rates and QA manning effectiveness (i.e.
pass rates are going down with increased QA manning effectiveness) and only seven
bases had low-to-moderate positive correlations. Overall, the data is inconclusive for a
command-wide correlation between QA manning effectiveness and Phase KTL Pass rates
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(see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). We will now examine the Quality
Verification Inspection Pass Rate metric.
Quality Verification Inspection (QVI) Pass Rate

The QVI Pass Rate metric is an inspection that QA personnel perform that can
cover a broad array of processes. It could be an inspection on a completed maintenance
action or one in progress, or an inspection on a facility or on an equipment item. It is a
macro-measure of unit and technician performance and provides an overall status of
maintenance operations and compliance with directives. It is calculated as:
QVIPass(%)=

NumberQVIsPassed
*100
NumberQVIsPerformed

The table in Appendix AQ reveals nine of the bases having a moderate-to-high positive
correlation between QVI Pass rates and QA manning effectiveness (an increase in QA
manning effectiveness is accompanied by an increase in QVI Pass rates). Also, five of
the bases’ data indicate a moderate-to-strong negative correlation (an increase in QA
manning effectiveness is accompanied by a decrease in the QVI Pass rate). This is
interesting because it could be signaling that the QVI trend at a particular base may be a
function of management emphasis and organizational dynamics (see Survey, Part-1
Comments, Appendix F). The next metrics to be examined are the Repeat and Recur
Rates.
Repeat and Recur Rates

Although these two measures are tracked separately at HQ ACC/LGP, AFI 21101 does not break them out. However, since we have the data, we will analyze them
separately here. The mathematical calculations for repeats and recurs are (respectively):
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Repeat(%) =

TotalRepeats
*100
TotalNumberPilotReportedDiscrepancies

Recurs(%) =

TotalRecurs
*100
TotalNumberPilotReportedDiscrepancies

A Repeat is when the same malfunction occurs on the very next flight after it was
repaired and a Recur is when the same malfunction for which an aircraft was repaired,
occurs on the 2nd through 4th flights. According to AFI 21-101, Repeat and Recur rate
metrics are leading indicators and perhaps the most important and accurate measure of
the unit’s maintenance quality. When we examine the Repeat Correlations table in

Appendix AS, we find that ten of the 14 bases have at least one aircraft type with low-tomoderate negative correlations between Repeat rates and QA manning effectiveness rates
and seven bases with low-to-moderate positive correlations. When we examine the
Recur correlations table (see Appendix AS), we discover that eleven of 14 bases have at
least one aircraft type with negative correlations between Recur rates and QA manning
effectiveness rates, and six with positive correlations. The overall analysis suggests that
Repeat and Recur rates are potentially trended with QA manning effectiveness levels at
the majority of bases in the study (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The next
metric to be examined is the Safety and Technical Violation Count.
Safety and Technical Violation (STV) Count

The STV Count is a composite metric and is the number of times QA personnel
observe either: (1) a person performing an unsafe act (DSV); (2) a person not following
technical directives (TDV); or (3) an unsatisfactory condition (UCR). This metric is
computed in the same way as DSVs explained earlier. Like the QVI Pass rate, it is a
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macro-metric and gives maintenance managers quick feedback to enable them to take
immediate corrective measure to avoid injury or damage to property.
The STV correlations table in Appendix AL reveals that eight of the 14 bases
have a moderate-to-strong negative correlation between STV counts and QA manning
effectiveness while six bases have a weak-to-moderate positive correlation between STV
counts and QA manning effectiveness. This seems to suggest that there is a relationship
across ACC bases for STV counts relative to QA manning effectiveness where as QA
manning effectiveness increases, the STV count rate declines possibly due to QA’s
increased presence influencing personnel to avoid taking shortcuts (see Survey, Part-1
Comments, Appendix F). The next metric we examine is the Technical Data Violation
Count.
Technical Data Violation (TDV) Count

The TDV count is a subset of STV counts and is calculated in the same manner.
A TDV occurs when an individual performs a task, and either doesn’t have technical data
with him/her, or fails to follow the procedures according to the technical data. Analysis
of the data in Appendix AM reveals that eight of the 14 bases have a moderate-to-strong
negative correlation between TDV counts and QA manning effectiveness while only five
bases have a weak-to-moderate positive correlation between TDV counts and QA
manning effectiveness. This metric is behaving consistently with the STV count. This
suggests that there is a correlation across ACC bases for TDV counts relative to QA
manning effectiveness (i.e. as QA manning effectiveness increases, the TDV count rate
declines) possibly due to QA’s increased presence influencing personnel to avoid taking
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shortcuts (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The next metric to be examined
is the Total Non-Mission Capable for Maintenance Rate.
Total Non-Mission Capable for Maintenance (TNMCM) Rate

The TNMCM Rate metric is a lagging indicator and is considered to be the most
common and useful measure for determining if maintenance is being performed quickly
and accurately. It is the average percentage of possessed aircraft that cannot complete
their primary assigned mission due to maintenance reasons (except depot-type

maintenance) (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.11.2). The correlation table in Appendix AG
indicates that twelve of 14 bases exhibited moderate-to-high negative correlations
between TNMCM rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in at least one of their
assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period. Furthermore, five bases exhibited
low-to-moderate positive correlations between TNMCM rates and QA manning
effectiveness. An overall analysis suggests that there is a negative correlative trend for
TNMCM rates and QA manning effectiveness levels across the bases under study (see
Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F). The last metric we will examine is the
Technical Order Improvement Submitted Count.
Technical Order Improvement Submitted (TO Imp Submitted) Count

The TO Imp Submitted Count metric reflects the number of instances where
technicians submit TO improvement recommendations. Like the DRs Submitted metric,
the TO Imp Submitted metric measures the proactive level of personnel within a
maintenance organization. Our theory is that the more technical order improvements that
are submitted, the more deeply engaged technicians are with their jobs. Analysis of the
correlation table in Appendix AK reveals a dichotomous split between and among the
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ACC bases in the study with half exhibiting a weak-to-moderate positive correlation
between TO Imp Submitted and the calculated QA manning effectiveness and the other
half revealing a weak-to-moderate negative correlation between TO Imp Submitted and
the calculated QA manning effectiveness. Now that we have examined all of the
indicated metrics for a possible linear relationship with QA manning effectiveness, we
conduct one last test to determine any significant relationships (see Survey, Part-1
Comments, Appendix F). We will do this in this next and last section of this chapter by
employing statistical linear regression.
Regressing the Data

In order to determine linear relationships for the types of data across all bases
under study, we performed simple linear regressions on the indicated metrics. Because
we are seeking an interpretive model to be used at the base level, we aggregated the
delimited data in metric areas containing multiple data sets across all assigned aircraft
units at each base to get an average measure (i.e. MC, TNMCM, Break, etc.). This
enabled us to describe the average behavior of the variable across multiple aircraft types.
However, the count-type data did not require this transformation.
We arranged the data into columns for all participating ACC bases in a
contemporaneous (no-lag) format with each base and then ran each of the regressions and
analyzed the output specifically for level of significance and direction of relationship.
Although we had several metrics with respectable R-squared values, the degree of fit is
not our most important consideration. This is because, although the R-squared value is
considered as a prime factor when determining usefulness of a predictive model, we are
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creating interpretive models. Thus R-squares of greater than 0.05 were considered useful
as long as the p-value was significant. After all, we can not reasonably expect to have
any single independent variable (in our case QA manning effectiveness) explain all of the
variation for any of the dependent metric variables in the study – there are just too many
moving parts in a USAF flying unit. However, the R-squared values do provide useful
information nonetheless. One final concern did emerge in our analysis.
In our data we found five of nine metric data types with Durbin-Watson test
values that were outside of the normally acceptable level. However, according to Oxley,
although there are transformations that can be applied to the data to try and eliminate
this condition, it may not always be successful (Oxley, 2000). In our study we understand
a priori that this will most likely be the outcome since our data is serially related.

Furthermore, recent studies indicate that even when heteroskedasticity cannot be
eliminated, valid inferences can still be made (Oxley, 2000). Since we appended our

base-level data sets into a single file, we therefore expect serial correlation (see Appendix
BT). This may bias these parameters, but Oxley implies that it will not affect our overall
conclusions because it affects efficiency instead of accuracy.
Interpreting the Data

The QA manning variable is interpreted as an elasticity value for non-count
dependent metrics. The Elasticity formula is:

E y,x =

ΔY X %ΔY
• =
(E= expected value; Δ=the change in)
ΔX Y %ΔX
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So, for our purposes, a one percent increase in the QA Manning value will yield a 0.7
percent decrease in the break rate. This also holds true for the other dependent variables
listed in Tables 22 and 23. Conversely, when interpreting the impact on a Count-type
metric (see Table 24), the marginal improvement is an amount (e.g. a -0.01 Dropped
Object incremental change means that a 100 percent increase in QA Manning
Effectiveness will result in one less dropped object at each base). Tables 25 and 26 show
the respective compiled information for rate and count data (also refer to Appendixes BW
through CG for regression outputs).
Table 22 – Statistically Significant Metrics (rates – part-1)
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Table 23 – Statistically Significant Metrics (rates – part-2)

Table 24 – Statistically Significant Metrics (counts)
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Table 25 – Compiled Elasticities for RATE Metrics

Table 26 – Compiled Incremental Changes for COUNT Metrics

An Example Benefit Cost Analysis Using the Dropped Objects Results

A thumbnail benefit cost analysis provides some guidance on the role of QA in
reducing costs to the Air Force. This example assumed an annual personnel cost of
$75,000 for each QA NCO added. Also, note that the result of adding one NCO would
be a four percent increase in QA manning effectiveness until the QA flight reaches 100
percent manning effectiveness. Furthermore, we assumed a conservative average
dropped object-cost of $2,000 per event (this includes all costs across the entire value
chain – cost of the part, the investigation, the resultant inspections, etc.).
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We found that a four percent increase in QA manning effectiveness (adding one
NCO to each base’s QA staff) suggests that we will have approximately four fewer
dropped objects at each base. When applied to a single base, this translated to:
Annual Dropped Object Savings = ( − 4.4DOPs)*16Bases)*(12Months)*($1K) = $1,689,600

Next we calculated the costs of adding one NCO to each base:

NCO$$All Bases=($75000perNCO)*(16bases)=$1,200,000
Finally we divided the Dropped Object savings by the cost of the “additional” personnel
to come up with the Benefit Cost Ratio:
Benefit Cost Ratio =

$1,689,600DOPsavings
= 1.408
$1,200,000NCOcost

Thus with a 1.408 benefit cost ratio for Dropped Objects, the USAF could realize an
annual savings of $489 Thousand. This example alone suggests that increasing the QA
manning effectiveness (i.e. assigning one more NCO to each ACC base’s QA flight
against authorized slots) is justified solely on the basis of decreasing Dropped Objects.
Metrics with No Direct Statistical Relationship to QA Manning Effectiveness

Seventeen of the metrics that the subject matter experts in the field indicated in
Survey, Part-1 that might be impacted by QA manning effectiveness were found not to
have statistically significant relationships. However, even though these metrics did not
pass the regression analysis, they should not be ignored by management (see Table 27
and review subject matter experts’ comments in Appendix F).
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Table 27 – Metrics Not Statistically Significant

Overview of the Next Chapter

Chapter VI concludes this research study where we answer the three investigative
questions and the research question. We also present managerial implications. Finally,
we review the research limitations and provide recommendations for future research.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction

This chapter discusses the conclusions drawn from the research by addressing
each of the investigative questions (IQ) that will in-turn answer the research question.
We will then present managerial implications and research limitations with the study.
Lastly, we will discuss potential areas for future research.
Findings

This section answers the questions posited in Chapter I. IQ-1 and IQ-2 are
answered through the Delphi survey as analyzed in Chapter IV, while IQ-3 is answered
through a statistical analysis of the metric data indicated in Chapter V.
Investigative Question #1: Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most
affected by an empty QA manning position or a mismatch?

This was answered through a Delphi survey. Thirty-four field- and headquarterslevel subject matter experts performed a computer-based qualitative survey where they
indicated on a six-point LIKERT scale how they felt the aircraft/munitions maintenance
QA function impacted each of fifteen listed metrics. The Delphi panel experts were then
given the opportunity to provide additional metrics which they felt would be significantly
impacted by QA effectiveness. The results were then aggregated to develop a candidate
list of metrics for further analysis. In the analysis, it was not surprising that the majority
of resultant metrics on the list having a 50 percent or greater median value as determined
by the Delphi survey, were comprised of metrics already tracked at unit and headquarters
levels (see Appendix G for a list of all indicated metrics and their significance levels).
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Investigative Question #2: What is the effectiveness of a person without the
Unit Manning Document-authorized Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) when
performing the QA duties of another AFSC (how good is the fit)?

This question was answered through a Delphi survey. Thirty-two subject matter
experts completed one round of the Delphi survey and 14 completed two rounds. A
supplemental Delphi survey was also completed to account for AFSCs that were
identified as new information after the initial aggregation of manning information from
the units at the beginning of the study. Fourteen subject matter experts completed this
supplemental survey. The result was the creation of a matrix that allows maintenance
managers to determine with some confidence the potential effectiveness of an individual
performing in a QA position designated for an AFSC other than the one they possess (see
Table 14). This tool also gives the maintenance manager the ability to analyze the entire
QA flight for effectiveness to gain an overall flight manning effectiveness. We did this
using the following rules:
1) If an authorized QA manpower position was filled with a person possessing the
AFSC called for in the UMD, the position effectiveness was rated at 100 percent
effective (e.g. a person with AFSC 2A5X3 was assigned to a 2A5X3 QA
position).
2) If the person filling a QA position possessed an AFSC other than that called for in
the UMD, the appropriate effectiveness level derived from the QA manning
effectiveness charts was assigned to that position (e.g. a person with AFSC
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2A5X3 was assigned to a 2A5X1 QA position would be rated at an effectiveness
level of 61 percent as derived from the QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix).
3) Instances where UMD manpower positions were double-filled (i.e. two persons
possessing AFSC 2A3X3 were assigned against one UMD-authorized 2A3X3
manpower position), were rated as 100 percent effective. The rationale for this
was that, although not authorized for in the UMD, these “extra” personnel provide
capability and more capability “should be better”, thus proper credit should be
applied to possibly offset deficiencies in other areas.
4) All unfilled QA positions were rated as zero percent effective.
The results of this analysis were then applied to each of 16 QA flights’ historical
manning to achieve the overall by-month manning effectiveness fit for a 24-month
period. We applied these results statistically against accumulated metrics for data types
identified in Investigative Question 1.
Investigative Question #3: What is the relationship between QA manning
effectiveness and the key unit and wing-level metrics?

This question was answered first through a quantitative correlation analysis,
together with a qualitative interpretation using time lags to address latent variable
characteristics. We first performed a macro-level analysis on unit-level correlation
relationships between each of the dependant variables and calculated QA manning
effectiveness at each base. We then subjected each metric data type to a cross-sectional
statistical analysis across all 16 participating Air Combat Command bases to determine
relationships.
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The statistical regression analysis uncovered nine of the 26 metrics identified by
the subject matter experts in the Delphi survey as being statistically significant (see
Tables 25 and 26). We then performed an example benefit cost analysis for changes in
QA manning effectiveness as they related to Dropped Objects. This analysis, using
hypothetical cost values, presented compelling evidence for maintenance managers to
scrutinize each decision to leave a manning slot empty, or to install a person with the
other than UMD-authorized credentials when manning individual QA positions. These
tradeoff investigations can help determine which management mitigating strategies to
employ to offset these potentialities.
The impact that maintenance QA has on key unit- and wing-level metrics is
summed up very eloquently in the following e-mail quote from one of our maintainer
experts in the field:

Chief Moore,
Concerning our phone conversation about QA Effectiveness, I would like to voice
an opinion I have from 22 years of aircraft maintenance experience. I have worked
as a ground crew member, assistant crew chief, crew chief, branch trainer, quality
assurance inspector, shift supervisor, flight chief and I now work in wing safety
preventing FOD/ DOP and flight related mishaps. I know the playing field inside and
out. I have felt the pain, instilled and facilitated it concerning quality assurance, and
the impact it has on the aircraft maintenance community.
Quality Assurance’s presence impacts the maintenance community by instilling
the old <stuff> rolls down hill theory. When Quality Assurance discovers or is
informed of a trend that is not IAW TO guidance, they level the playing field by
letting the units know that they will be putting emphasis on that area. The units
respond by ensuring the area is in compliance with AF directives. Any breach in the
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agreement will surface quickly as QA holds up their end of the bargain by identifying
any more discrepancies. Those discrepancies are then disseminated by the
leadership when the quality inspection result is presented to the unit. In turn, actions
are taken to correct the unsatisfactory condition.
v/r
MSgt Webb
2 BW FOD/DOP Prevention NCO
Recommendations for Action

We propose the following recommendations for action. Note that they are not
without interpretation and thus should not be followed blindly.
1) Deploy the QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix and instructions to field QA units
to enable them to calculate their current overall QA manning effectiveness rates.
2) Each unit could use the effectiveness matrix on an individual basis to determine
the effectiveness of a person possessing a “mismatch” AFSC would be in a QA
position. This will enable QA managers faced with recurring shortfalls to make
more informed decisions when assigning personnel from high-demand, lowdensity specialties.
3) Each unit could perform an analysis of their key unit- and wing-level metrics for
presence of trends or to uncover areas where they are consistently below
standards.
4) To uncover useful vectors to apply management attention to, each unit could
perform a statistical regression through their analysis shop to determine the
strength and direction of any linear relationships with the calculated QA manning
effectiveness. This will help them rule in/out low QA manning effectiveness as a
potential contributing factor to deficient areas indicated by their metrics.
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Future Research

Future research efforts could concentrate on performing a Benefit Cost Ratio
analysis with other military or civilian organizations with high-demand, low-density
resources. This would provide unit managers with empirical data to support manning
decisions. Also, the metric relationships that were indicated in the study could possibly
be investigated through a structural equation modeling technique to uncover potential
additional linkages. Lastly, this methodology could be applied to other low-density,
high-demand functions to uncover potential impacts in order to develop strategies to
mitigate problems before they can occur or worsen.
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Appendix A: Delphi Computer-Based Survey – Part-1
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Appendix B: Delphi Computer-Based Survey – Part-2
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Appendix C: Delphi ROUND TWO Survey, Part-2 E-mail Instructions
Sir/Ma’am,
Let me first thank you for completing the FIRST ROUND of this DELPHI study. As you
know, a DELPHI study is a qualitative procedure in an attempt to get subject matter
experts to gain agreement within certain statistical bounds on a subject in which they
are expert. We have analyzed the data from ROUND ONE and found sufficient
statistical difference (specifically the coefficient of variation) on most ratings amongst all
PANEL'S experts to perform a SECOND ROUND. The attached EXCEL file contains 4
matrix sheets (Matrix #1, #2, #3, and #4). Each sheet has 3 tables on it: (1) Working
Matrix of Group Mean Ratings -- Out of Limit Ratings; (2) How You Rated -- Round
#1; (3) Means for All Panel Member Ratings. The basic instructions for completing
this DELPHI SECOND ROUND is to analyze the aggregate results from the top table on
each <Matrix> sheet against your ratings from ROUND ONE (your data is provided in
the middle table labeled "How You Rated -- Round #1"), and adjust your ratings as you
deem appropriate. Please ensure to make all adjustments to the top table on each matrix
page. On the EXCEL file there are two other sheets: (1) AFMAN 36-2108 AFSC Duty
Desc and (2) Base Files. The AFMAN 36-2108 sheet has all of the job descriptions for
all of the AFSCs on the survey. You can disregard the <Base Model> sheet -- it is
included because it is necessary for all of the links to work within the file. I have also
attached a separate word.doc file with detailed instructions on how to complete the
survey. Lastly, I sincerely apologize but due to the tremendous amount of time ROUND
ONE took, ROUND TWO will have to be completed and sent back to me by COB 24
Dec 04.
Vr
CMSgt Moore
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Appendix D: Delphi ROUND TWO Survey, Part-2 Instructions

AFSC Fit Matrix for Aircraft QA

Survey Control Number: USAF 04-098
Privacy Notice
The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:
Purpose: To obtain information regarding potential effects of manning assignment
practices within USAF Aircraft Quality Assurance (QA) flights. You have been
identified as a person with a wide-breadth of experience in the aircraft and/or
munitions maintenance manning arena and further, you have already voluntarily
completed ROUND ONE of Survey, Part-2. This is ROUND TWO of the survey and
we are asking you to analyze the aggregated responses from ROUND ONE and make
changes as you see fit. Please use the 0% to 100% rating scale and evaluate how
well a “typical” person holding each of the listed AFSCs would reasonably be
expected to perform the duties of a person in each of the listed AFSC QA positions.
For example, a dog trainer might perform the duties of a cat trainer at an
effectiveness level ‘20%’ where a dog trainer would perform the duties of a dog
trainer at an effectiveness level ‘100%’ (note: 0% = Totally Ineffective ; 100% =
Totally Effective ).
Routine Use: The survey results will be used to assist aircraft maintenance managers
when making QA manning decisions. A final report will be provided to participating
organizations. No analysis of individual responses will be conducted and only
members of the Air Force Institute of Technology research team will be permitted
access to the raw data.
Participation: Participation is VOLUNTARY. No adverse action will be taken
against any member who does not participate in this survey or who does not complete
any part of the survey.
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Instructions
•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Base your answers on your own thoughts & experiences.
This attached EXCEL file uses your DELPHI Panel Member number and is
personalized with your responses from ROUND ONE. It is your file and
only you can fill it in!
Open the EXCEL file labeled with your assigned DELPHI Member number.
Then, click on <Matrix #1> sheet at the bottom of the page. Go through the top
table on this page and analyze the DELPHI Panel Group’s MEAN statistical
ratings from ROUND ONE. Compare these MEAN ratings against your ratings
from ROUND ONE that appear in the middle table on the same sheet. Make all
changes to the top table only. The third and bottom table on the sheet contains
all of the DELPHI Panel Group’s MEAN statistical ratings from ROUND ONE
(Note: this table is provided for your information only because some of the top
table’s cells are darkened in and locked out due to their statistical significance.
The top table’s cells with percentages have statistical differences across
DELPHI Panel responses and can be adjusted.
Your ROUND ONE data is provided in the table labeled "How You Rated -Round #1" (NS in a cell means No Score was given in ROUND ONE). Please
note that you can provide an AFSC combination rating on ROUND TWO even
if you did not provide one in ROUND ONE.
The ratings in the top table are the statistical MEANS of how all DELPHI Panel
Experts rated each of the AFSC combinations. These subjective ratings indicate
how effective the group feels a “typical” person with the AFSC appearing down
the left side would be if assigned to the QA AFSC position that intersects that
cell from the top row of AFSCs.
In ROUND ONE, we used a rating scale of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 which translated
to 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% respectively. In ROUND TWO, these
ratings have been converted to “percentages of effectiveness” in order to
“tighten up” the data and give rating flexibility.
Where the same AFSC from the left column (Y-axis) and QA AFSC position
from across the top of the table (X-axis) intersect within the table, they are
darkened out in the top table and are marked as 100% Totally Effective in the
middle and bottom tables.
Remember, these are personnel performing duties of personnel in a “typical”
aircraft/ munitions QA flight. Do not rate personnel as if they were performing
normal duty tasks as they would when assigned to a MX squadron, MSA, or a
flight line AMU.
Note: the 2A590 AFSC is a feeder to the 2A300 Chief Enlisted Manager (CEM)
AFSC. The 2A3X0 and 2A6X0 AFSCs are 9-level or CEM positions; all others
are 5 or 7-level positions. Rate all AFSCs in the aggregate (i.e. no difference
between a ‘5‘ and ‘7’ or ‘9‘ and ‘0’ levels).
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•

•

•
•

•

When filling in the table with percentage effectiveness ratings, evaluate them
against what you understand encompasses the whole AFSC duty position and
not just AFSC-specific tasks (i.e. in some QA flights, an avionics technician
‘might’ perform APG task inspections, assist in Weight and Balance operations,
and/or evaluate drop-tank build-up operations besides only inspecting avionicstype tasks).
Each table cell has a comment that appears if you pass the pointer over each cell
or click on the cell. The comment refers to how effective a person with the
AFSC from the left column (Y-axis) would be if assigned to the QA AFS duty
position from the top row (X-axis). Each cell has its own specific comment – no
two comments are the same. (NOTE: the ‘comment’ may mislead you if you
just use the arrow buttons for navigation within the table -- you have to
<click> on each cell). This will help you get through faster {e.g. Crew Chief
(Non-Tac Acft) Jymn/Crftmn effectiveness in Structural MX Jymn/Crftmn QA
Position}.
If you are not familiar with a particular AFSC, leave that cell blank.
After completing sheet < Matrix #1>, click on and open up the sheets labeled
<Matrix #2>, <Matrix #3>, and <Matrix #4> one at a time, in numerical
order, and complete each of the top tables using the same criteria and procedures
you used on sheet <Matrix #1>.
E-mail the completed EXCEL file back NLT COB 24 Dec 04 to the
RESEARCHER ONLY.
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Appendix E: Delphi ROUND TWO Survey, Part-2 Instrument
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Appendix F: Historical Manning Spreadsheet Sent Out to ACC QA Flights
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Appendix G: Delphi, Survey Part-1 Results
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Appendix H: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A0X1
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Appendix I: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X0
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Appendix J: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X1
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Appendix K: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X2
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Appendix L: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X3
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Appendix M: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A590
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Appendix N: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A5X1
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Appendix O: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A5X2
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Appendix P: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A5X3
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Appendix Q: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X0
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Appendix R: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X1
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Appendix S: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X2

160

Appendix T: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X3
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Appendix U: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X4
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Appendix V: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X5
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Appendix W: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X6
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Appendix X: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A7X3
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Appendix Y: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A7X4
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Appendix Z: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2E1X1
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Appendix AA: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2E2X1

168

Appendix AB: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2M0X1
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Appendix AC: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2W0X1
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Appendix AD: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2W1X1
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Appendix AE: Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2W2X1
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Appendix AF: Abort Rate and MX/Ops Deviation Count Correlations
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Appendix AG: MC and TNMCM Rate Correlations
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Appendix AH: Break and Fix Rate Correlations
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Appendix AI: Cannibalization Rate Correlations
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Appendix AJ: Dropped Objects and Foreign Object Damage Count Correlations
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Appendix AK: Deficiency Report and TO Improvement Submitted Correlations
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Appendix AL: Safety and Technical Violation Count Correlations
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Appendix AM: DSV and TDV Count Correlations
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Appendix AN: FSE and MSE Rate Correlations
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Appendix AO: Combined and Ground Mishap Count Correlations
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Appendix AP: Flight Mishaps and In-Flight Emergency Rate Correlations
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Appendix AQ: QVI and PE Pass Rate Correlations
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Appendix AR: Key Task List (KTL) and Phase KTL Pass Rate Correlations
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Appendix AS: Recur and Repeat Rate Correlations
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Appendix AT: Barksdale AFB Data
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Appendix AU: Beale AFB Data
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Appendix AV: Cannon AFB Data
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Appendix AW: Davis-Monthan AFB Data
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Appendix AX: Dyess AFB Data
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Appendix AY: Ellsworth AFB Data
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Appendix AZ: Holloman AFB Data
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Appendix BA: Langley AFB Data
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Appendix BB: Minot AFB Data
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Appendix BC: Mountain Home AFB Data
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Appendix BD: Nellis AFB Data
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Appendix BE: Offutt AFB Data
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Appendix BF: Pope AFB Data
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Appendix BG: Seymour-Johnson AFB Data
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Appendix BH: Shaw AFB Data
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Appendix BI: Whiteman AFB Data
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Appendix BJ: Data Arrangement for Statistical Regression (10-pages)
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Appendix BK-1: Barksdale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BK-2: Barksdale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004

Appendix BL-1: Beale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BL-2: Beale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BM-1: Cannon AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BM-2: Cannon AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BN-1: Davis-Monthan AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BN-2: Davis-Monthan AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004

243

Appendix BO-1: Dyess AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BO-2: Dyess AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BP-1: Ellsworth AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BP-2: Ellsworth AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BQ-1: Holloman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BQ-2: Holloman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BR-1: Langley AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BR-2: Langley AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BS-1: Minot AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BS-2: Minot AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BT-1: Mountain Home AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BT-2: Mountain Home AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BU-1: Nellis AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BU-2: Nellis AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BV-1: Offutt AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003

258

Appendix BV-2: Offutt AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BW: Pope AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BX-1: Seymour-Johnson AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BX-2: Seymour-Johnson AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BY-1: Shaw AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BY-2: Shaw AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix BZ-1: Whiteman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003
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Appendix BZ-2: Whiteman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004
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Appendix CA: Survey, Part-1 Results w/ Validation
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Appendix CB: Survey, Part-1 Results, Fill-In w/ Validation

Appendix CC: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and Break Rate
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Appendix CD: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and CANN Rate

Appendix CE: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and DOP Count
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Appendix CF: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and FSE Rate

Appendix CG: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and KTL Pass Rate
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Appendix CH: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and MSE Rate

Appendix CI: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and QVI Pass Rate
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Appendix CJ: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and Repeat Rate

Appendix CK: Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and STV Count
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Appendix CL: AFSC Job Descriptions (3-sheets)
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